Order in the Courtroom, Silence on the Courthouse
Steps: Attorneys Muzzled by Ethical
Disciplinary Rules
INTRODUCTION

Speech encourages action and change; silence creates stagnation and oppression.' Unlimited sources of speech effectuate
the search for truth and enlighten society. 2 Sophisticated techI Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 884-85 (1963). Suppression of speech prevents change and, contrary to its
intended effect, suppression neither eliminates the thoughts behind the speech nor
fosters "loyalty and unity." Id. at 884. See Irwin P. Stotzky, A Gathering of Legal
Scholars to Discuss "The FirstAmendment: A Special Privilegefor the Press?" - Forward:The
First Amendment and the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 785 (1980). In analyzing the essential nature of free speech in a democratic society, Stotzky quoted John Stuart
Mill's condemnation of restraints on free expression:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it
If the opinion is right, they are deis robbing the human race ....
prived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.
Id. at 786 n.5 (quotingJohn S. Mill, On Liberty, in SELECTED WRITINGS OFJOHN STUART MILL 135-36 (M. Cowling ed., 1968)). Stotzky also quoted literary artist John
Milton's recognition of the necessity of speech:
[A]II opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is truest ....
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple;
who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?
Id. at 786 n.4 (quotingJohn Milton, Aeropagitica, in AEROPAGITICA AND OTHER PROSE
WRITINGS BY JOHN MILTON 19-20, 59 (W. Haller ed., 1927). See also COMMISSION ON
THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 1791-1991:

THE BILL OF

RIGHTS AND BEYOND 17 (Herbert M. Atherton & J. Jackson Barlow eds., 1991)
[hereinafter COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL] (people must have the right to
speak freely because only "informed and involved citizens" can ensure the success
of a democratic America); Thomas R. Nilsen, Free Speech, Persuasion, and the Democratic Process, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 229, 230 (Thomas L. Tedford
et al. eds. 1987) (democracy requires that ideas are expressed, evaluated, utilized
and "translated into policies"); Rene' L. Todd, Note, A PriorRestraint by Any Other
Aame: The JudicialResponse to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (1990) (the power to govern belongs to the people
and governance can only be successful if the people gain "intelligence, integrity,
sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare") (quoting Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 253 (1961)).
2 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354 n.2 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter emphasized that uninhibited speech required varying
opinions and a diversity of sources for those opinions. Id. See Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Holmes established the
marketplace of ideas theory with his statement that free trade in ideas was essential
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nology and rapid'communication have made the press an inexorable force in the modern legal arena,3 informing society with a
to democracy and "the best test of truth [w]as the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market"); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 46 (1984) [hereinafter REDISH, FREEDOM OF Ex-

(claiming that the marketplace of ideas theory originated not with Justice
Holmes, but with John Stuart Mill who analogized speech to commodities, i.e.,
good products are sold while bad products remain on shelves and competing ideas
will similarly be tested in the public market); Jeffrey Cole and Michael I. Spak, Defense Counseland the First Amendment: "A Time to Keep Silence, and a Time to Speak," 6 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 347, 353 (1974) (unlimited sources for speech, rather than silencing
particular sources, remedies the evil of harmful speech); Emerson, supra note 1, at
881 (in the search for knowledge an individual must be permitted to analyze all
sides of an issue, gather information from all available sources and then "sift the
true from the false"); NILSEN, supra note 1, at 240 (constraining the availability of
sources weakens democracy by preventing citizens from becoming fully informed);
Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial
Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003, 1006, 1012 n.58 (1984) [hereinafter Swift, Model
Rule 3.6] (an understanding of the judicial system requires exposure to "more than
one voice" and Disciplinary Rule 3.6's substantial likelihood standard impermissibly reduces the sources of information that contribute to the free flow of information regarding the judicial process) (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972)); Martha E. Johnston, Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 671, 692 (1979) (the public
has a compelling interest in receiving from all sources as much information regarding the judicial process as possible to protect the accused's right to a fair trial).
3 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548 (1976). Justice Burger acknowledged that modern technology increased the problems associated with selecting an impartialjury. Id. See Fred Graham, Keynote Address: The Impact of Television on
the Jury System: Ancient Myths and Modern Realism, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 623, 628 (1991)
(television does not have an inordinate effect on jurors because jurors do not concentrate so intensely on any one "channel" to so solidly fix one point of view in
their minds which could not be influenced by new or different information); Panel
Discussion on Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press, 19 F.R.D. 16, 42 (1955) (freedom of
the press was never intended to "give such multiple distraction [through television]
entree to a court" because the framers did not anticipate the power of media coverage available today); Nancy Blodgett, Equal Access Report: Let the Defense Tell Its Story,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 29 [hereinafter Blodgett, Equal Access] (prosecutorial
media use has greatly increased and defense counsel should have equal ability to
use the media to preach to the public); Priscilla A. Schwab, Talking to the Press, LITIGATION, Summer 1986, at 26 (society has "progressed geometrically" in regard to
media and communication methods; use of those methods, however, has not
progressed to a balance between over-use and under-use of the media and remains
caught in a state of "reactive extremism" characterized by sensationalism at one
extreme and rigid no comment rules at the other).
See also Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an ImpartialJuror in an Age of
Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631 (1991). Minow and Cate referred to Mark
Twain's humorous but enlightening comment on the impact that advancing media
technology, even a century ago, had on the judicial system, as compared to the time
of Alfred the Great:
[N]ews could not travel fast, and hence [Alfred] could easily find a
jury of honest, intelligent men who had not heard of the case they
were called to try - but in our day of telegraph and newspapers his
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voice that cannot be ignored.4 But while public and media attention monitor the judicial system, publicity may also infringe on
the rights of individuals participating in that system. Thomas
Jefferson cautioned, however, that publicity is "an evil for which
there is no remedy" because First Amendment rights "cannot be
limited without being lost."' 6 The United States Supreme Court

and many state legislatures and bar associations have chosen to
ignore Jefferson's warning.7
plan compels us to swear in juries composed of fools and rascals, because the system rigidly excludes honest men and men of brains.
Id. at 634 (quoting MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 307 (Iowa Center for Textual Studies ed. 1972) (1871)).
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02[D] (1984) (only
speech conveyed through the mass media effectively reaches the majority). See Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 354-55 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Without free press there
can be no free society. Freedom of press, however, is not an end in itself but a
means to the end of a free society.")); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 863
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (to gather the information needed to exercise its voting responsibilities, the public must rely on the press).
5 Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-JudiciaryRelations: What the NonLegal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3
(1989) (detailing the history of the troublesome results of trial press coverage). See
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) (the competing interests of free
press and fair trial are difficult to prioritize); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 81.1 commentary at 8.9 (pure speech regarding the judicial system "enjoys the
strongest possible presumption of First Amendment protection").
6 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 548 (quoting 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
239 U. Boyd ed., 1954)). See NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 1.02[B] (if the "truth" is
not the guaranteed result of publicity the actual product of speech will bring society
as close to truth as humanly possible); Emerson, supra note 1, at 886 (unrestrained
expression may delay problem resolution and threaten unrest but society cannot
always be totally controlled because "[c]hange is inevitable"; free speech ensures
"rational, orderly adjustment" more effectively than suppression and the risks accompanying free speech are "the lesser evil"); Paul Marcus, The Media in the Courtroom: Attending, Reporting, Televising Criminal Cases, 57 IND. L.J. 235, 236 (1982)
(discussing the American citizens' acceptance and protectiveness of their freedom
to express themselves). But see William H. Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The
PracticalDilemma, 29 STAN. L. REV. 485, 495 (1977) (blind adherence to Jefferson's
admonition against limiting speech and press may lead to evils just as harmful as
limiting speech); Valerie P. Hans, Law and the Media, An Overview and Introduction, 14
LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 399, 400 (1990) (one of the dangers of unrestrained
press is that the media "actively constructs social and political reality").
7 See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding no
constitutional bar to attorney speech restraint); see also infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text for discussion of Hirschkop. For other courts that have rejected the
more protective clear and present danger test in favor of the reasonable likelihood
test, despite First Amendment concerns, see generally Gentile v. State Bar, III S.
Ct. 2720 (1991); The News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
1991); Stretton v. Disciplinary Board, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. IlI. 1991); In re Eisenberg, 423 N.W.2d 867
(Wis. 1988); In re Lasswell, 673 P.2d 855 (Or. 1983); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 449
A.2d 483 (1982); In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 449 A.2d 505 (1982).
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When analyzing the conflict between free speech and impartial trials, the Supreme Court has consistently required a clear
and present danger before justifying speech restraint.' Recently,
however, in Gentile v. State Bar,' the Court withdrew this protection, adopting a substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard for attorney comment regulation. ' ° In doing so, the
Supreme Court devalued attorneys' First Amendment rights" by
validating vague disciplinary rules that attempted to silence prejudicial speech. 2
8 See, e.g., Bridges, 314 U.S. at 268 (declaring that states would not be permitted,
through the use of the contempt power, to infringe "historic constitutional meaning" of free speech); Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 335 (mandating that only speech posing a clear and present danger to the judicial process justified restraint); Nebraska
Press Ass 'n, 427 U.S. at 562-63 (only clear and present danger to fair trial warranted
gag orders). For discussion of these cases see infra notes 20- 41 and accompanying
text.
For discussion of the clear and present danger test, see Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Justice Holmes, articulating the clear and present
danger test, stated: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent"); DAVID S. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY, THE COURT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 31-42 (1984) (history and application of clear and present danger
test); H. L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, FREE SPEECH AND THE
LIVING CONSTITrrTION 65-70 (1991) (analyzing the Schenck opinion in which Justice

Holmes articulated the test). But see Cole & Spak, supra note 2, at 369 (some speech
is "inherently prejudicial" and therefore warrants regulation under attorney comment restrictions regardless of clear and present danger).
9 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
10 Id. at 2745.
I The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12 See infra note 81 (suggesting that the standards do not clearly delineate specific prohibited comments but rather express broad classifications leaving attorneys
to blindly interpret them). The structuralist interpretation of the First Amendment
asserts that "all other values assume and depend upon unfettered communication."
Joseph F. Kobylka & David M. Dehnel, Toward a Structuralist Understanding of First
Amendment and Sixth Amendment Guarantees, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 363, 366 (1986).
The functionalist interpretation, however, opines that the First Amendment is beneficial to society provided that it encourages the "proper functioning of political
institutions" and must be viewed together with other interests, such as a fair trial,
national security and public welfare. Id. One commentator, comparing the First
Amendment to other constitutional provisions, posited that the First Amendment
was more precise than most of the other primary restrictions on the power of government and was "of exceptional crispness and clarity." WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 22 (1984). For example, the Fourth

Amendment restricts searches and seizures when they are unreasonable, the Fifth
Amendment requires due process before rights may be taken away, and the Eighth
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In endorsing this less stringent standard, the Court abandoned traditional First Amendment protection" and condoned
Amendment prevents the imposition of excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment. Id. These provisions all guarantee a right but only a qualified or limited
right. Id. The First Amendment includes no limiting or qualifying language and
therefore must be unequivocal and absolute. Id.
For additional discussion of the broad nature of First Amendment protection,
see Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263 (the First Amendment does not equivocally protect
speech but broadly forbids the enactment of any law which infringes on the freedoms of speech and press); NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 4.02 (defining the abridgement of speech and postulating that the First Amendment forbids restraint before
speech and punishment after speech); Anthony Lewis, Keynote Address: The Right to
Scrutinize Government: Toward a FirstAmendment Theory of Accountability, 34 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 793, 806 (1980) (the First Amendment must include the right to monitor or
"scrutinize government"); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, reprinted in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, A COLLECTION OF
BEST WRITINGS 63, 75 (Kent Middleton & Roy M. Mersky Eds., 1981) (the First
Amendment does not simply encompass the freedom to speak but protects "the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern' "
and involves a public power and a government responsibility); Stotzky, supra note 1,
at 785 (the First Amendment "is more than a rule of law; it is an honored tradition
within our society").
For discussion on limitations on First Amendment protection, see Bridges, 314
U.S. at 282-83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (free speech is not an absolute right or
an "irrational" theory which requires the "paralysis" of all other rights included in
the Bill of Rights when they clash with the First Amendment: "[a] trial is not a 'free
trade in ideas,' nor is the best test of truth in a courtroom 'the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.' "). Alexis De Tocqueville
claimed that First Amendment protection, in practice rather than in theory, was not
sufficient:
I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind
and real freedom of discussion as in America. .

.

. In America the

majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion;
within these barriers an author may write what he pleases, but woe to
him if he goes beyond them.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,

1

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

263-64 (Francis Bowen trans. &

Phillips Bradley ed., 1984).
One commentator noted that there were two polar interpretations of the scope
of speech rights under the First Amendment. Cal M. Logue, Free Speech: The PhilosophicalPoles in Perspectives on Freedom of Speech, Selected Essays From the Journals of Speech Communication Association 69, 70 (Thomas L. Tedford et al. eds.
1987). Favoring limitations on First Amendment rights, Thomas Hobbes claimed
that security is more desirable than liberty and therefore society should advocate
more control and regulation of speech and less freedom. Id. at 70, 76. Adopting
an opposite view, John Stuart Mill emphasized the necessity for freedom and the
accompanying principle that the government should not be permitted to infringe
upon a man's liberty unless others are harmed. Id.at 74.
13 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 240 ("When the claim of restrictions on the substantive news is raised, the press normally prevails."); infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text (discussion of the Supreme Court's consistent protection of First
Amendment speech rights under the clear and present danger test). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) (the First Amendment prevents prior restraints which had been used by other governments); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1966) (in effectuating the theory that "justice can-
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censorship.' 4 The Gentile holding therefore denigrated First
Amendment rights to express opinions, gather information, advocate reform, and publicly refute accusations.1 5 Effectively
divested of First Amendment rights, attorneys must compromise
their professional obligations.16
Part I of this comment explores Gentile's departure from the
United State Supreme Court's consistent protection of free
speech during criminal trials. Part II contrasts the harmful impact of these speech limitations with the negligible evidence that
the speech would affect juries. Part III proposes alternative
methods of protecting fair trials without inhibiting expression.
PART I

A.

History of Free Speech and Criminal Trials
1.

The United States Supreme Court

Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court limited
speech narrowly and only when absolutely necessary. 1 7 Even
not survive behind walls of silence," the press is the "handmaiden of effective judicial administration"); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 383 (1947) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) ("any inroad made upon the constitutional protection of a free press
tends to undermine freedom of all men to print and read the truth").
14 The Gentile holding and current disciplinary rules lack clear guidance,
threaten attorneys with disciplinary sanctions and therefore encourage self-censorship. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text (discussing the impact these
rules have on attorneys and the satisfaction of their professional obligations).
15 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 648 (1977) ("[Sjociety must, I think, preserve a climate in
which citizens can seriously consider the option to engage in civil disobedience as a
means of combatting abuses of official power."); see infra notes 148-61 and 177-99
and accompanying text for discussion of the impairment of societal interests that
attorney comment rules create.
16 Michael E. Swartz, Note, Trial ParticipantSpeech Restrictions: GaggingFirst Amendment Rights, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1411, 1422-23 (1990) (attorneys, fearing disciplinary
action, will remain silent and neglect their obligation to expose injustice and vigorously advocate on behalf of their client). See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying
text for discussion of the effect of disciplinary rules on attorneys.
17 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (First Amendment protected
attorney advertising); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (individual wearing
jacket declaring "Fuck the Draft" was protected by First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ku Klux Klan freedom of expression protected
unless threat of violence was substantial and imminent); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (police official's libel award for disparaging advertisement
placed in New York Times by opponents was reversed as violating free speech
rights); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down statute prohibiting
press from publishing malicious and scandalous defamatory papers). This protection of free speech rights began as early as John Peter Zenger's trial for libel, in
1735, in which a jury acquitted him despite the fact that jurors were instructed only
to determine whether Zenger printed the alleged comments, which he admitted,
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when First Amendment rights clashed with other constitutional
rights, the Court consistently protected speech unless it posed a
clear and present danger to the government or society."8 Applying the clear and present danger analysis to the judicial forum,
the Court proclaimed that the First Amendment protects public
access to criminal trials, the right to gather information from
those attending trials and the ability to criticize the judicial
process.m9
and not whether the comments were libelous or untrue. COMMISSION ON THE BiCENTENNIAL, supra note 1, at 14. Zenger's attorney, Andrew Hamilton, commended
the jury for its recognition of the sacredness of free speech: "You have laid a noble
foundation for securing to ourselves that to which Nature and the Laws of our
country have given us a Right - The Liberty - both of exposing and opposing
arbitrary Power by speaking and writing Truth." Id. See Todd, supra note 1, at 1207
(primary purpose of the First Amendment is protection and encouragement of "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social change;"
protection extends to communication process as a whole); REDISH, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, supra note 2, at 175-86 (history of clear and present danger test); WARREN FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS TO THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 92 (1988)
[hereinafter FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS] (the reasonable likelihood standard fails to adequately protect freedom of speech).
18 See supra note 17 for discussion of First Amendment protection in various
circumstances.
19 For examples of cases in which the Court found that public access rights
either did not conflict with or outweighed interests in protecting the trial process
from interference see Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting a witness from revealing testimony before a grand
jury after grand jury terminated the investigation); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (a First Amendment right of access to criminal proceeding
transcript could be limited only narrowly and when essential to the preservation of
a higher interest); Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (statute prohibiting press access to testimony of minor victims of sex offenses found
unconstitutional); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980)
(noting that a significant factor in evaluating speech rights in judicial contexts was
that "throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe"); Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (reversing criminal sanctions for divulging information regarding state review of judicial
misconduct because "solidity of evidence" was not offered to show that a clear and
present danger existed); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (restraints on access to information were only justified when a clear and present danger to fair judicial processes existed); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
(restriction on attorney speech justified only if compelling interest exists); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (reversing conviction of a sheriff for criticizing actions of trial judge because conviction violated First Amendment protection because comment did not present a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (attorney's allegations of partiality in a
trial were protected); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (finding no clear
and present danger to administration of justice and, therefore, newspaper article
allegedly unfairly reporting events in a trial and attacking trial judge did not warrant conviction of newsman; "[w]hat transpires in the courtroom is public property"); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (protecting newspaper cartoons
criticizing events in non-jury proceedings); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252

1408

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1401

In Bridges v. California,2 ° the Supreme Court applied the clear
and present danger test to protect media criticism ofjudicial conduct during a criminal trial. 2 ' Applying free speech protection to
the states under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 2 the majority posited that the First Amendment
was intended to afford the broadest scope of protection possible
in an "orderly society. ' ' 23 Justice Black, writing for the Court,
stated that evaluating the potential threat of a particular comment required consideration of the attendant circumstances and
the likelihood of actual harm.2 4 The Court, noting that neither
an inherent nor a reasonable tendency to cause harm justified
speech restraint, concluded that the harm must not merely be
likely but virtually certain.2 5
The Supreme Court continued strict protection of judicial
criticism in Pennekamp v. Florida.2 6 The Court again mandated the
clear and present danger test to determine an expression's capacity for danger.2 7 On behalf of the Court, Justice Reed reiterated
the recommendation in Bridges that free expression be given the
broadest protection without jeopardizing the administration of
justice. 2 ' The Court also cautioned against prohibiting expression, noting that once the door
to free expression was closed, "it
29
close[d] all doors behind it."
(1941) (reversing the conviction of newspaper publisher, protecting the right to
criticize judicial actions); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (articles and
cartoons regarding judge and impartial administration of justice were protected by
the First Amendment).
20 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
21 Id. at 262-63. The Supreme Court reversed the contempt convictions of a
newspaper publisher and editor for out-of-court statements regarding a judge's actions in a pending case. Id. at 258, 270.
22 Id. at 268. The Court acknowledged that Bridges, for the first time since 1925,
presented the Court with the constitutionality of a state's use of the contempt
power. Id. The Court declared that state decisions would not be permitted to "destroy the historic constitutional meaning of freedom of speech and of the press."
Id.
23 Id. at 265. The Court paralleled the scope and purpose of speech rights to
that of freedom of religion and assembly. Id.
24 Id. at 271. Justice Black warned that all utterances cannot be deemed prejudicial to trials. Id.
25 Id. at 262-63, 272-73.
26 328 U.S. 331 (1946). The Supreme Court reversed the contempt convictions
of a publisher and an editor for publishing cartoons and editorials which criticized
actions of state circuit courts and judges in non-jury proceedings. Id. at 333, 350.
27 Id. at 335.
28 Id. at 347. The Court advised that in "borderline instances" the freedom of
speech outweighs the possibility of prejudice. Id.
29 Id. at 350. The Court recognized, however, that such a right is not absolute
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Focusing specifically on attorney speech rights in In re Sawyer,3" the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of disciplinary restraints on extrajudicial comment. 3 ' Writing for the
Court, Justice Brennan stated that an attorney should be permitted to attack improper judicial administration despite personal
involvement. 3 2 The Justice declared that trial participation does
not render attorneys' extrajudicial comments more censurable.3 3
Recognizing the importance of governmental scrutiny, the Court
noted that effective criticism of abuse must inform the lay person
as well as the professional.3 4
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,3 5 the Supreme Court considered the regulation of trial participants' speech via specifically
and must be weighed against the necessity for control over the administration of
justice in a particular case. Id. at 349-50. The right to speak must yield when the
danger to fair adjudication is clear, immediate and substantial. Id. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, stated that keeping the door of public comment open is essential to safeguarding society's and the accused's rights. Id. at 354-57 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
30 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
31 Id. at 623-25. The Bar Association of Hawaii brought charges against Sawyer
for questioning the impartiality and fairness of a trial judge in a highly publicized
Smith Act trial. Id. at 623-24. The defense attorney criticized the FBI's investigation, the insufficiency of evidence and the youth of the defendants. Id. at 629. Defense counsel was sanctioned for violating Canons 1 and 22 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics. Id. at 625. Canon 1, entitled "The Duty of the Lawyer to the
Courts," required the attorney to maintain a respectful attitude towards the court.
Id. n.3. Canon 22, entitled "Candor and Fairness," mandated that an attorney's
conduct be "characterized by candor and fairness" and that a lawyer should not
attempt to improperly influence the court. Id.
32 Id. at 636. The Court noted that no distinction should be drawn between an
attorney involved in a case and an attorney uninvolved. Id. Justice Brennan asserted that attorney comment should not be restricted for attacking the credibility
or honesty of the judiciary because appellate courts often disparage other courts
without any "disgrace" to the judiciary: "The public attribution of honest error to
the judiciary is no cause for professional discipline in this country." Id. at 635.
33 Id. at 636. The Court condemned any restriction on an attorney's out-of-court
remarks solely on the basis of his involvement in litigation. Id. The majority asserted that such comments should not be deemed any more "censurable" than similar remarks made by a different source. Id. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, argued
that granting attorneys free reign jeopardized their responsibilities to the bar and
encouraged the trial of cases in the press rather than the courtroom. Id. at 649
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter also declared that an attorney participating in a trial was no longer an ordinary citizen but "an intimate and trusted
and essential part of the machinery of justice" and must forgo the opportunity to
speak immediately and wait until a more appropriate time or simply make his claims
to the court. Id. at 668 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 632. The Court opined that "oftentimes the law is modified through
popular criticism." Id.
35 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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tailored gag orders.3 6 Although recognizing the constitutionality
of gag orders in exceptional cases, the Court noted that only
where a clear and present danger exists is speech restraint justified. 3 7 Chief Justice Burger mandated that gag orders restrict
speech narrowly and only to protect more compelling interests.3 8
36 Id. at 541. The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a gag order that restrained the press from reporting accounts of the accused's confession, or information implicating the accused in a murder, despite the fact that all the parties
consented to the order. Id. at 541-42, 570. For analysis of the Nebraska Press holding and its implications, see Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29
STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977) (analyzing Nebraska Press holding and doctrine of prior
restraint with respect to gag orders and discussing subsequent punishment and
prior restraint); James C. Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The PracticalEffect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1977)
(concluding that the Nebraska Press opinion is a major victory for the press); Robert
D. Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411
(1977) (criticizing Nebraska Press holding for failing to protect the press's constitutional rights); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of
Freedom and Contractionof Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431 (1977) (analyzing the Nebraska
Press opinion and cases leading up to it and assessing Nebraska Press's impact on the
free speech and fair trial issue); Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. & Ian D. Volner, Nebraska
Press Association: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1977) (questioning whether courts will actually heed the Court's Nebraska Press ruling or disregard it
and continue to infringe speech rights); Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in
Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News
Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977) (broad gag orders are unnecessary since
juries are able to put aside knowledge gained from the media and look only to the
evidence presented in court when reaching a verdict); Diane Pappas, Comment,
FirstAmendment Protectionof CriminalDefense Attorney's ExtrajudicialStatements in the Decade Since Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 1021 (1987)
(analyzing the different standards incorporated in gag orders by federal courts of
appeals); Swartz, supra note 16, at 1420-21 (analyzing Nebraska Press's endorsement
of gag orders and the appropriateness of such orders under the First Amendment);
Todd, supra note 1, at 1175-81 (analyzing the use and appropriateness of gag orders in general). See also PaulJ. Rudinsky, Note, Finding the Path Between An Attorney's
FirstAmendment Right to Free Speech and A Client's Sixth Amendment Right to a Fair Trial:
Levine v. U.S. District Court, 22 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 187 (1986) (comparing Nebraska Press Ass'n with Levine v. United States District Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
1985), in which the Ninth Circuit struck down a court order that precluded attorney
comment even before jury selection).
37 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 563, 570. The trial judge could only speculate
on the effect publicity would have on jurors not yet chosen and so could conclude
only that a clear and present danger might exist. Id. at 563. See Pappas, supra note
36, at 1025.
38 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 566. The Court included in those interests the
impartiality of jurors. Id. In protecting the impartiality of jurors, however, the
Court mandated consideration of the unpredictable impact of information on jurors and the possibility that the publicity would not bias the jurors. Id. at 567. See
Joel H. Swift, Restraints on Defense Publicity in CriminalJury Cases, 1984 UTAH L. REV.
45, 53-54 (1984) [hereinafter Swift, Restraints] (the Nebraska Press test measures the
gravity of evil and the probability of harm occurring and requires that these factors
justify imposing prior restraints as necessary).
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Acknowledging the finely drawn distinction between productive
and destructive speech, the Court demanded that a comment create such a clear and present threat to the impartiality of potential
jurors that twelve could not be found capable of rendering a fair
verdict.3 9 The Court recommended consideration of three factors before issuing gag orders: a) the nature and extent of the
pretrial publicity; b) the availability of other measures to alleviate the effects of unrestricted pretrial publicity; and c) the restraining order's ability to prevent the threatened danger.4 0 The
majority concluded that when the impact of publicity was speculative, when alternate methods to mitigate the harm existed and
when the success of a restraining order was unpredictable, an order would not escape the presumption of unconstitutionality. 4 '
The Supreme Court also acknowledged the dangers created
by unrestricted pretrial publicity in Sheppard v. Maxwell.4 2 A circus of media attention engulfed the murder trial in Sheppard
which the trial judge neglected to monitor or control.4 ' The
judge failed to sequester the jury,44 order a change of venue or
delay trial until publicity receded.4 5 Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, burdened the trial judge with the primary responsibility
39 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 567, 569. The Court also noted that the temporary nature of a gag order's burden on speech did not lessen the government's
burden of proving that the restraint was necessary. Id. at 559. Justice Powell, concurring, recognized that gag orders must be based on a "high likelihood" of harm
to the judicial system. Id. at 571. The Justice explained that the proponent of a
restriction must show: a) that a clear threat to fair judicial processes existed;
b) that the threat was posed by the particular publicity to be restricted; and c) that
no other less restrictive means existed to prevent the harm. Id. at 571 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan, also concurring, noted the democratic preference
for punishing First Amendment abuses only after the abuse occurred and not restraining a wider range of speech in order to prevent the abuse from occurring. Id.
at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 562. The Court emphasized Learned Hand's warning that the gravity of
the harm must be "discounted by its improbability." Id.
41 Id. at 569. The Court enumerated the alternatives to gag orders discussed in
Sheppard: change of venue, postponement, voir dire, jury instructions and sequestration. Id. at 563-64.
42 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
43 Id. at 338-49. See infra note 46 for details of the publicity sanctioned by the
trial judge. See also Sheldon Portman, The Defense of Fair Trialfrom Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 393, 404 (1977) (judge did nothing to monitor publicity or to instruct jurors
primarily because he thought he was powerless to act).
44 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 345, 349. The judge only sequestered the jury during
deliberations, not during the trial itself. Id. at 349.
45 Id. at 352-53. The Court declared that "the arrangements made by the judge
with the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of that 'judicial serenity and
calm to which [he] was entitled.' " Id. at 355.
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to mitigate the egregious effects of rampant media attention.4 6
Unfortunately, the Sheppard holding spawned restrictions on attorney comment as bar associations and courts misinterpreted
Sheppard as an endorsement of the reasonable likelihood standard
for attorney speech restriction. 4 7 Although the Court recommended attorney speech restraints, that suggestion was limited
to the specific circumstances in Sheppard.48
46 Id. at 363. The Supreme Court in Sheppard overturned a murder conviction,
finding overwhelming evidence of prejudicial pretrial publicity that the trial judge
failed to control by any of the traditional methods. Id. at 335. A doctor was convicted for murdering his wife. Id. The uncontrolled press activity surrounding the
trial consisted of the following abuses: the press reported in detail a "re-enactment" that the defendant was coerced into performing for the coroner and a police
officer without the presence of counsel; the press made a live broadcast of an inquest in which the coroner, prosecutor, detectives and hundreds of spectators attended, but in which the defense counsel was not permitted to participate and from
which he was forcibly removed when attempting to defend his client; newspaper
reports detailing the proceedings from the date of the murder until the defendant's
conviction occupied five volumes; press and other media were given free reign in
the court house during the trial and allowed to set up broadcasting equipment in a
room next to the jury room to broadcast during trial and juror deliberations; no
restraints were issued regarding photography except during actual sessions at
court; movement by the press within the courtroom was loud and often disturbed
the proceedings; crowding within the bar of the courtroom prohibited confidential
conversations between defendant and his counsel; press reported on the jurors,
detailing the home life of an alternate juror; a day before the verdict was delivered
the jurors, who had been sequestered for their lunch break, were separated into
two groups and photographed for pictures later published in the newspaper; and
jurors, who were not sequestered during the body of the trial, were allowed to
make daily telephone calls while sequestered during deliberation. Id. at 338-349.
The Court relied on a New Jersey case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
advocated restraint of trial participants' speech. Id. at 361 (citing State v. Van
Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1964)).
47 Courts have relied on Sheppard when endorsing standards for attorney comment that are less protective of attorney speech. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 111
S. Ct. 2720, 2741 (1991) (endorsing the substantial likelihood test for attorney disciplinary rules); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 1979) (validating
the reasonable likelihood standard); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 619, 449 A.2d 483,
491 (1982) (upholding the reasonable likelihood test). Many drafting committees
claimed that Sheppard endorsed a lower standard of protection for attorney comment. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-FairTrial" lssue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 401 (1968) [hereinafter Kaufman Committee
Report] (committee, chaired by Judge Irving R. Kaufman, recommending restrictions on attorney comment and citing Sheppard). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-1-7 (1980) (recommending the "reasonable likelihood" standard). See infra notes 57-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
committees.
48 See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 865, 925 (1990) (since Sheppard mandated that a trial judge take measures
to protect the trial, some justifications for no comment rules disappear and are only
needed when the judge cannot or will not restrain prejudicial speech); Portman,
supra note 43, at 393 n.4 (an attorney who witnessed the trial analyzed Sheppard and
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Various authorities misinterpret the Sheppard Court's intent.49 Although Justice Clark suggested that an attorney collaborating with the media should be disciplined, the Court did not
advocate restraining attorneys in general.5 0 The Justice instead
warned that collusion which threatened the administration ofjustice would not be tolerated as an expression of free speech.5 '
Similarly, the Court's suggested that trial courts control participants' statements.52 This suggestion did not advocate restrictions on all attorney commentary but merely endorsed explicit
orders restraining participants in a specific trial.5 3 The Court referred to a reasonable likelihood test only with respect to a particular trial judge's obligation to alleviate prejudice. 4 The
Court's decision, therefore, cannot be removed from the circumstances of the Sheppard trial.55 Discussion of publicity's evils and
the methods available to mitigate these evils was ancillary to the
Court's holding that the trial judge improperly neglected his
duties.56
detailed the judge's neglect, attributing it partially to the judge's mistaken belief
that the court lacked the power to do anything); Max D. Stern, The Right of the Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 84-85 (1983) (Sheppard did
not present facts on which to assess the impact of defense comment but, unfortunately, the Court's dictum established a basis for restraints by suggesting that the
speech of all trial participants interfered with trial).
49 These authorities quote statements in the Court's opinion out of context. See,
e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that, if not
expressly, the Sheppard Court implicitly endorsed attorney speech restraint). For
other misinterpretations of the Sheppard holding, see cases cited supra note 47.
50 Sheppard, 314 U.S. at 363. The Court noted that the cure for publicity "lies in
those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception." Id.
51 Id. The Court warned that "collaboration between counsel and the press as
to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures." Id.
52 Id. at 359. The Court recommended that trial judges "control the release of
leads, information, and gossip to press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel
for both sides." Id.
53 Id. This description implicates methods such as gag orders which restrict all
participants.
54 Id. at 363. The Court argued that a trial judge in circumstances such as those
in the Sheppard trial should have recognized the harm caused by the extensive publicity and taken measures to mitigate the harm. Id. at 362-63. Such measures included continuing the case until publicity and public outcry abated, transferring the
case to another court, sequestering jurors during the trial, and ordering a new trial
if publicity could not be resolved in the current trial. Id. at 363.
55 See supra note 47 for discussion of authorities taking the Sheppard holding out
of context. See also, Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 49-50 ("Sheppard was clearly
not about defense publicity" but about a trial judge who believed he was powerless
to control the publicity and allowed the press to monopolize the courtroom and
interfere with the trial process).
56 Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 50 (the Sheppard Court devoted 12 pages and
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Disciplinary Comment Rules

The misreading of Sheppard yielded a debate among courts
and bar associations regarding the proper standard for attorney
comment rules. 57 The American Bar Association's continually
changing codes and rules of conduct generated most of the litigation. 58 In 1908, the American Bar Association developed the Ca3200 words to describing the rampant publicity unchecked by the trial judge, which
did not include a single example of defense attorney comment, and only 19 words
regarding statements by the accused). See Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at
1045 (the constitutionality and propriety of attorney comment regulations was
neither briefed nor argued in Sheppard); Comment, supra note 36, at 1031 (the Sheppard Court did not address the constitutionality of the reasonable likelihood standard or any other standard for attorney speech restraints); Matheson, supra note 48,
at 917 ("Because no comment rules apply generally to extrajudicial lawyer speech,
their enforcement is at least a step removed from the Sheppard trial court's fair trial
management function.").
57 For courts endorsing the clear and present danger standard, see In re Oliver,
452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1354 (D.P.R. 1978); In re Lasswell, 673 P.2d
855 (Or. 1983). For courts adopting the reasonable likelihood test see United
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); In re
Eisenberg, 423 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1988); National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman,
501 N.Y.S.2d 405 (App. Div. 1986); In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1984); In re
Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 449 A.2d 505 (1982); People v. Dupree, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203
(1976); Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1973). See also infra notes
95-120 and accompanying text for detailed analysis of four notable cases examining
the conflicting standards.
58 See Robert H. Aronson, ProfessionalResponsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51
WASH. L. REV. 273, 319 (1976) (the constantly changing ethical standards recommended by the ABA have resulted in "a set of ambiguous and contradictory rules"
and the "inability to impose discipline effectively in all but instances of the most
egregious misconduct"). These abundant variations of the rules have resulted
from their lack of success in actually resolving ethical dilemmas. Richard L. Abel,
Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 642 (1981). Abel
detailed the various rules, focusing on the faults of the Kutak Commission and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 639-52. The ABA, according to Abel,
simply restated the dilemma in "mystifying language that obscures the issues
through ambiguity, vagueness, qualification; and hypocrisy" so they must be constantly revised to renew their force. Id. at 686. For a critical analysis of Professor
Abel's allegations, see Marvin E. Frankel, Why Does Professor Abel Work at Such a Useless Task?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 723, 725 (1981) (criticizing Abel for failing to propose
alternative solutions).
For a thorough analysis of the ABA disciplinary standards and their implications, see 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §§ 201-205 (2d. ed. 1990) (concise chronology and description of the various
rules); FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS, supra note 17, at 88-92 (analyzing the
evolution and changing standards of the ABA rules and discussing rules governing
contact and communication with jurors, witnesses and officials); Stern, supra note
48, at 84-95 (detailing the various committees and reports on defense lawyer comment and the litigation following each committee's recommendations); Reed E. Loder, Tighter Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Saltwaterfor Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
311, 323 (1987) (comparison of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
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nons of Professional Ethics.5 9 Canon 20 specifically addressed
out-of-court statements by attorneys.60 The Canons, however,
were unable to address the growing scrutiny of the criminal justice system by the press or to eliminate disruptions in the trial
process. 6 ' The conflict between the public's right of access and
the government's interest in administering justice without interference climaxed with the investigation of the Kennedy assassination. 62 The Warren Commission, conducting a highly publicized
inquiry, expressed the need for ethical restraints to ensure that
public curiosity would not impair an accused's rights.6 3
In response to the Warren Commission's recommendations,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, classifying the latter as more descriptive
yet "seek[ing] too much and too little"). Cf ABA COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER

PROFESSIONALISM 6-7 (1986) (the rules encourage minimum standards of conduct

but fail to encourage lawyers to achieve higher ethical standards).
59 FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS, supra note 17 at 88. The first code of

legal ethics formulated in this country was created in 1887 in Alabama. Gentile v.
State Bar, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2740 (1991). That Code warned attorneys to avoid media comment because such publicity tended to prejudice the administration ofjustice. Id. Until the nineteenth century, attorney conduct was governed by the
common law and by unofficial and advisory compilations based on principles of
legal ethics. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 57, § 201. State bar associations began
adopting advisory codes of ethics based on these compilations. Id. See also Deborah
L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A FunctionalPerspectiveOn ProfessionalCodes, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 689, 693 (1981) (noting that in the early 1900's an "influx of new practitioners" required disciplinary rules which were previously unnecessary).
60 Canon 20, entitled "Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation," stated:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be
condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a
statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously.
An exparte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from
the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases
it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND

15 (1957). Opinion 199 stated that although the committee
"doubt[ed] that the effect of public opinion would sway or bias the judgment of the
trial judge in an equity proceeding," the defendant should not have to risk prejudice to his case. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
199 (1957).
61 See Paul C. Reardon, The Fair Trial-Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A. J. 343
(1968) (pretrial publicity was a concern of trial judges and the bar and many advocated restrictions); Matheson, supra note 48, at 873 (Canon 20 was too vague to
GRIEVANCES

provide adequate guidance for attorneys and was rarely enforced).
62 Matheson, supra note 48, at 873.
63 Id. The Warren Commission published the Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy (1964), which suggested
that Lee Harvey Oswald could not have been given a fair trial due to all the media
attention surrounding the assassination. Id. at n.36.
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the American Bar Association appointed The Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, in 1964, to revise the Canons.'
That Committee proposed the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, applying the less protective "reasonable likelihood
of material prejudice" standard which was quickly adopted in
64 Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2740 (1991). The Advisory Committee on
Fair Trial and Free Press, chaired by Paul C. Reardon of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, was a special committee to the Committee on Minimum
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, led by J. Edward Lumbard,
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Reardon, supra note 61, at 343. The Committee recommended that guidelines for ethical conduct be established to ensure that there would not be any interference with
the administration of justice in criminal matters. Kaufman Committee Report,
supra note 47, at 407. See also Drechsel, supra note 5, at 8-9 (Reardon Committee
and other commissions promulgating rules was a response to the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission's report); Portman, supra note 43, at 407 (the
Reardon Committee, following the Sheppard holding, advocated several remedies
for trial publicity); Schmidt, supra note 36, at 452-55 (Reardon Committee initiated
extensive evaluation of the fair trial - free press dilemma).
The American Newspaper Publishers Association also studied the impact of
publicity on trials and a committee of newspaper executives issued its report, Free
Press and Fair Trial, on January 5, 1967. Kaufman Committee Report, supra note
47, at 397 n.6. The Bar of the City of New York also conducted its own investigation under the Special Committee on Radio, Television, and the Administration of
Justice of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, chaired by Senior
Judge Harold R. Medina of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. at
397 & n.7. This Committee, originally composed in 1963, released its first report
in 1965, entitled Radio, Television and the AdministrationofJustice: A Documented Survey
of Materials, and its final report, entitled Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial, in 1967.
Id. Like the Reardon Committee, the Medina Committee suggested greater restraints on trial participant speech rather than the use of contempt power against
the press. Drechsel, supra note 5, at 9. The Committee also encouraged the media
to voluntarily devise its own code of ethical conduct. Id.
Relying on the Reardon and Medina Committee reports, and in response to
the Supreme Court's holding in Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Judicial Conference of the
United States created a committee to study the need for guidelines relating to publicity. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2741. The Committee published its recommendations
in the Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair
Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 404-15 (1968) (also known as the Kauffman Report).
Stern, supra note 48 at 89 n. 117. The Committee was chaired by Judge Irving R.
Kaufman and limited its study to the effects of pretrial publicity in criminal cases.
Kaufman Committee Report, supra note 47, at 392-93 (1968). The Kauffman Committee recommended local rules that would control out-of-court statements posing
a reasonable likelihood of interfering with or prejudicing the trial process, particularly in highly publicized cases. Stern, supra note 48, at 89.
For more information regarding these studies and their recommendations, see
Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1033-37 (focusing primarily on the Reardon
Committee); Matheson, supra note 48, at 873-74 (detailing the history of the rules
and early unenforced rules); Portman, supra note 43, at 407-08 (detailing the aftermath of Sheppard and the steps taken by the A.B.A. Committee); Stern, supra note
48, at 88 (discussion of the Medina Committee).
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many jurisdictions.6 5 The Model Code addressed pretrial publicity and attorney comment in Canon 20, Ethical Consideration 73366 and Disciplinary Rule 7-107.67 In 1978, however, the American Bar Association adopted the Standards for Criminal Justice,
65 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, at § 202. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, adopted by the ABA in 1969, was organized in three parts: 1) generalized axiomatic principles or Canons; 2) explanatory provisions which were
called Ethical Considerations or EC's; and 3) black letter rules called Disciplinary
Rules or DR's. Id. DR's represented the minimum standard of legal ethics. Id.
The Canons and Ethical Considerations were intended as guidelines, but all three
principles were usually given the same binding effect by the courts. Id. For commentary on these rules, see FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS, supra note 17, at
89 (DR 7-107 guarantees fair trials by balancing free speech and the need to prevent interference with the trial process); Loder, supra note 58, at 331 ("the tripartite
structure of the Model Code may be unworkable, but it recognizes the complexity" of
professional conduct issues); Stern, supra note 48, at 88 n. 114 (the Reardon Committee advocated attorney restraints without sufficient examination of First Amendment concerns).
66 Ethical Consideration 7-33 provided that:
A goal of our legal system is that each party shall have his case, criminal or civil, adjudicated by an impartial tribunal. The attainment of
this goal may be defeated by dissemination of news or comments
which tend to influence judge or jury. Such news or comments may
prevent prospective jurors from being impartial at the outset of the
trial and may also interfere with the obligation ofjurors to base their
verdict solely upon the evidence admitted in the trial. The release by
a lawyer of out-of-court statements regarding an anticipated or pending trial may improperly affect the impartiality of the tribunal. For
these reasons, standards for permissible and prohibited conduct of a
lawyer with respect to trial publicity have been established.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-33 (1980).
67 Disciplinary Rule 7-107, entitled "Trial Publicity," provided in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that does more than
state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description
of the offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance
in other matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of
a criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint,
information, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest
until the commencement of the trial or disposition without trial, make
or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including
arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
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promulgated by the Goodwin Committee, to regulate prosecu(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a
lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or
statement given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a
statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
refusal or failure of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the
evidence, or the merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from
announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the
accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use
of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence
seized, other than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in
the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial
proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a
lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial
statement that a reasonableperson would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication and that relates to the trial,parties, or issues in the trial or
other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that
he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the
court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a
criminal matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or
law firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or
participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public communication and
that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer
from replying to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or
from participating in the proceedings of legislative, administrative, or
other investigative bodies.
() A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees
and associates from making an extrajudicial statement that he would
be prohibited from making under DR 7-107.
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tion and defense counsel conduct during criminal trials.6" The
standards were proposed following the Supreme Court's recognition in Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart 69 that prior restraints on the
press violated First Amendment rights." Perceiving that the
Sheppard holding overvalued fair trial interests to the detriment of
free speech, the drafters attempted to redefine the balance of
these two equally important rights. 7 Standard 8-1.1,72 addressDR 7-107 (1980) (emphasis added)
(omitted sections DR 7-107(F)-(H) address professional and juvenile disciplinary
proceedings, civil actions and administrative proceedings). Eleven states have
adopted Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
and the reasonable likelihood of prejudice test: Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee and Vermont.
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2741 n.2.
68 Stern, supra note 48, at 92.
69 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
70 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Introduction at 8.45 (2d Ed. Supp.
1986).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

71 See id.
72

Standard 8-1.1, addressing extrajudicial comments, provided:
(a) A lawyer shall not release or authorize the release of information
or opinion for dissemination by any means of public communication if
such dissemination would pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the
trial.
(b) Subject to paragraph (a), from the commencement of the investigation of a criminal matter until the completion of trial or disposition
without trial, a lawyer may be subject to disciplinary action with respect to extrajudicial statements concerning the following matters:
(i) the prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments, or
other charges of crime), the character or reputation of the accused,
or any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as to the
merits of the case or the evidence in the case;
(ii) the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the accused, or the refusal or failure of the accused
to make statement;
(iii) the performance of any examinations or tests, or the accused's
refusal or failure to submit to an examination or test;
(iv) the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses;
(v) the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged, or other
disposition; and
(vi) information which the lawyer knows or has reason to know
would be inadmissible as evidence in a trial.
(c) It shall be appropriate for the lawyer, in the discharge of official or
professional obligations, to announce the accused's name, age, residence, occupation, family status, and, if the accused has not been apprehended, any further information necessary to aid in the accused's
apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers that may exist; to
announce the fact and circumstances of arrest (including time and
place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons), the identity
of the investigating and arresting officer or agency, and the length of
the investigation; to announce the identity of the victim if the release
of that information is not otherwise prohibited by law; to announce, at
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ing extrajudicial comment, required proof that the comment
would create a clear and present danger to judicial administration before restraint was warranted. 7" The Goodwin report left
the punishment of attorney comment to a case by case analysis,
affording attorney speech rights great deference.7 4 Standard 81.1 failed to include any guidance, however, in applying the clear
75
and present danger test.
In 1977, examining the Goodwin Committee's suggestions,
the ABA proposed a fourth set of standards under the Kutak
Commission 76 in response to criticism that the Code of Profesthe time of seizure, a description of any physical evidence (other than
a confession, admission, or statement); to announce the nature, substance, or text of the charge, including a brief description of the offense charged; to quote or refer without comment to public records of
the court in the case; to announce the scheduling or result of any
stage in the judicial process; to request assistance in obtaining evidence; and to announce without further comment that the accused
denies the charges.
(d) Nothing in this standard is intended to preclude the formulation
or application of more restrictive rules relating to the release of information about juvenile offenders, to preclude the holding of hearings
or the lawful issuance of reports by legislative, administrative, or investigative bodies, or to preclude any lawyer from replying to charges
of misconduct that are publicly made against him or her.
2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE standard 8-1.1 (1978) (emphasis added).
73 FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS, supra note 17, at 92 (offering a thorough analysis of Standard 8-1.1). The change to a clear and present danger analysis reflected the "dramatic upsurge in constitutional law affecting the area, a
revolution in media technology, and a growing perception among many lawyers
and laypersons that the courts should be opened more fully to public scrutiny."
KennethJ. Hodson, Report No. 1 of the Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 103 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 680, 680 (1978). The Committee
acknowledged, although only in a footnote, that defense counsel's speech was valuable to a defendant's public defense. Stern, supra note 48, at 92. The Goodwin
Committee stated in its 1978 report that Standard 8-1.1 was based upon the decision in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), and provided a more specific regulation than the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. Hodson, supra at 681.
74 Stern, supra note 48, at 93. Statements relating to arrest, seizure of evidence
or denial of charges were absolutely protected. Id. The Committee adopted the
Reardon Committee's recommendations for prohibited speech and added restraints on information which lawyers knew or should have known would be inadmissible at trial. Id. at 93 & n.145. The Committee also added standard 3-1.1
specifically addressing prosecutors and their obligation to avoid interfering with
fair trials and standard 4-1.3 which delineated defense counsel statements that
should be avoided, particularly when intended to generate publicity for the lawyer.
FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS, supra note 17, at 92.
75 Stern, supra note 48, at 93.
76 The committee was also known as the ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, § 203.
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sional Responsibility was constitutionally overbroad. 7 The
Kutak Commission recommended the present Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, including Rule 3.678 governing trial pub77 Id. § 202. The Code was criticized because it did not recognize conflicts of
interest involving past clients, nonlitigation situations and the multifaceted organizations within which attorneys work. Id. Moreover, portions of the Code, particularly those that addressed advertising, were held violative of the First Amendment.
Id.
At the time of the Code's adoption, several representatives of the media opposed it, claiming that free speech did not harm the defendant and that these rules
deprived citizens of vital information making it difficult to fight corruption and injustice. Proceedings of the 1968 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 93
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 109, 118 (1968). Other media representatives argued that editors
should decide what information the public received and that the "total import of
the Reardon report is to dry up official sources of news and to encourage censorship in all its repugnance." Id. Delayed release of information was condemned by
these critics who claimed that "[t]o say that in the case of a Lee Harvey Oswald or
Richard Speck the fears and confusion of a gravely concerned nation or community
could be usefully allayed months after the event rather than at the earliest possible
moment cannot be a tenable proposition." Id. For current criticism of the Code,
see Loder, supra note 58, at 313 (criticizing the Code for its limited ability to answer
practical questions regarding attorney conduct and for failing to provide clear
guidelines). For detailed analysis of the Kutak Commission and its expressed purposes see Abel, supra note 58, at 646; Rhode, supra note 59, at 689.
78 The American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6
"Trial Publicity" stated:
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicingan adjudicativeproceeding.
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to
have such an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a
criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration, and the statement relates to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity
of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence
or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a
defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a
statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the
refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or
the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be
presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in
incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed
create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless
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licity.7" The new Model Rules revised the Model Code, adopting
a Restatement format8 0 and, in Rule 3.6, included a weak attempt
there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is
merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent
until and unless proven guilty.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and (b)(1-5), a lawyer involved in
the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without
elaboration:
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the
general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense
involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the
persons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;
and
(7) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the
accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1986) (emphasis added).
Thirty-one states have adopted this rule either verbatim or with minimal variations. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2741 n.l (1991). States adopting Rule
3.6 verbatim include: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missoui, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. States adopting variations
of Rule 3.6 include: Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wisconsin. Id. The New
Jersey rule provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable lawyer would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."
N.J.R.P.C. 3.6(a).
79 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, § 203. Two drafts were released in January 1980 and May 1981 and the Rules were officially adopted in 1983. Id. §§ 203,
205. For extensive analysis of Rule 3.6, its history and provisions, see Swift, Model
Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1028-54; 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, §§ 3.6:2003.6:401 (1985).
80 Id. § 203. The Model Rules are essentially black letter rules supplemented by
commentary. Id. See also Loder, supra note 58, at 323 (stating that the Kutak Commission and the new rules "abandon the division in the Model Code between 'aspirational' (and unenforceable) 'Ethical Considerations' and the mandatory
'Disciplinary Rules' " and instead adopts a black letter format for easier
enforcement).
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to reconcile the reasonable likelihood and clear and present danger standards by establishing a "substantial likelihood" test. 8 '
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were officially adopted
by the ABA in 1983, augmenting the confusion created by the
variety of state rules promulgated during the evolution of the
ABA rules.8 2 Three conflicting standards emerged that permit
speech restraint when: a) a clear and present danger of imminent harm is presented; b) a substantial likelihood of material
prejudice exists; or c) a reasonable likelihood of material prejudice is or should be recognized by the speaker.8 3
3.

Conflicting Standards and Rule 3.6

The emergence of three standards raises questions regarding the difference, if any, between the standards.8 4 Some commentators claim that none of the standards reconcile the
81 See Stern, supra note 48, at 95 n.150. Rule 3.6 does not indicate whether a
disciplinary board must prove a substantial risk was created or only that an attorney
"reasonably" should have foreseen the risk. Id. Requiring proof only that an attorney should have realized the risk allows courts too much discretion to punish regardless of the actual probability and immediacy of the risk. Id. But see FREEDMAN,
PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS, supra note 17, at 88 (Rule 3.6 avoids the "Scylla and
Charybdis" of the free speech and fair trial dilemma); 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra

note 58, § 3.6:102 at 665 (Rule 3.6 builds on DR 7-107 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility but changes the language and format and replaces the reasonable
likelihood standard with a substantial likelihood standard); Cornelia H. Tuite, A Slip
of the Lip, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1991, at 140 (Rule 3.6 was drafted to replace DR 7-107,
which was overbroad, and to approximate the clear and present danger test's
protection).
82 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, § 205. Twenty-nine states revised and
ten considered revising their standards during the ten years between the promulgation of the Model Code and the Rules. Abel, supra note 58, at 640 nn. 6-7. Abel
also cited a study reporting the existence of 4,786 ethics opinions-315 by the
ABA-and subsequent studies reporting 5,507 opinions including 1,086 by the
ABA. Id. at 640 n.7.
83 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE standard 8-1.1 commentary at 8.8

(1978).
84 See generally BOGEN, supra note 8, at 41- 42 (analyzing clear and present danger
test in trial context); Thomas K. Pfister, Casenote, Kemner v. Monsanto Company,
The Illinois Supreme Court Confronts the Free Speech/Fair Trial Controversy, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 581, 588-93 (1987) (comparing the standards and determining that

reasonable likelihood test is less restrictive and should be used in criminal trials
where a greater danger of harm exists); Joseph T. Rotondo, Note, A Constitutional

Assessment of Court Rules Restricting Lawyer Comment on Pending Litigation, 65 CORNELL
L. REV. 1106, 1111-19 (1980) (distinguishing the standards); Swartz, supra note 16,
at 1433-36 (reasonable likelihood standard is inconsistent with strong presumption
against prior restraints); Sally R. Weaver, Comment,JudicialRestrictions on Attorney's

Speech Concerning Pending Litigation: Reconciling the Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom of
Speech, 33 VAND. L. REV. 499, 503-12 (1980) (proposing dual standard because one
standard cannot accommodate different circumstances).
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competing First and Sixth Amendment interests due to the varying circumstances in which the speech occurs.8 5 The time element, however, separates the standards of speech protection.8 6
Under the clear and present danger test prejudice must be imminent and virtually certain.8 7 In contrast, the reasonable likelihood and substantial likelihood tests eliminate a clear time
element and permit restrictions when any chance of prejudice exists.8 8 Almost any comment could prejudice a jury under different circumstances at a different time; these standards therefore
85 Weaver, supra note 84, at 512. See Matheson, supra note 48, at 930-32 (proposing that courts consider several factors before punishing or restraining speech:
degree of harm, intent, burden of proof and timing).
86 See Patricia A. Sallen, Comment, Gag Me With a Rule-Arizona Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 (1985), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 129 (1987) (the reasonable and substantial likelihood tests redress a harm that may not be present); see also
Rotondo, supra note 84, at 1118 (the reasonable likelihood test lacks the imminence
requirement of the clear and present danger standard); Swartz, supra note 16, at
1414 n.25 (the difference in the standards is the stricter language in the clear and
present danger test that requires the "inescapable conclusion" that the speech will
harm).
87 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("The substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."); see also REDISH, supra note 2, at 204-06 (criticizing
Meiklejohn's absolutist analysis of the clear and present danger test and discussing
arguments that the test is overprotective); Pfister, supra note 84, at 592-93 (mere
chance of harm is not sufficient to justify restraint).
88 Rotondo, supra note 84, at 1118. The substantial likelihood test approved in
Gentile approaches the certainty of the clear and present danger test but, like the
reasonable likelihood standard, fails to require clear, imminent and virtually irreversible harm. The test is therefore unconstitutional. But see Weaver, supra note 84,
at 503-04 (clear and present danger and substantial likelihood tests are "substantively indistinguishable"). Hazard and Hodes equated "clear" with "material" and
"present" with "substantially likely" to support their claim that both standards
were equally effective. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, § 3.6:201. These definitions conflict with common usage. For example, Black's Law Dictionary defines
"clear" as "[o]bvious; beyond reasonable doubt ....
[F]ree from all limitation,
qualification, question or shortcoming.... Plain, evident, free from doubt or conjecture, unequivocal." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 250 (6th ed. 1990).
Black's, however, defines "material" as "[i]mportant; more or less necessary;
having influence or effect; going to the merits." Id. at 976. Thus, "clear" protects
more speech, requiring that the danger be grave and immediate, virtually a reality.
"Material," however, only requires that the danger be important and having an
influence, any influence, before it can be restricted. Black's defines "present" to
mean "now existing; at hand; relating to the present time; considered with reference to the present time." Id. at 1183. "Substantially" is defined as "belonging to
substance; actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary." Id. at 1428. "Likelihood" means "something less than reasonably certain." Id. Although "substantially" approximates the meaning and specificity of "clear," when coupled with the
word "likelihood," the clarity and certainty offered by "substantial" is tempered
and the standard as a whole allows more room for restriction and leaves the
speaker unsure of what may be safely said.
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restrict too much speech.8 9 The clear and present danger standard's explicit time element restricts only speech that creates immediate harm under the current circumstances. 9"
The rules and codes promulgated by the American Bar Association and state bars embrace the reasonable likelihood and substantial likelihood standards and therefore operate under these
timing and certainty deficiencies. 9 ' Some commentators classify
these disciplinary rules as unconstitutional prior restraints.9 2
Many commentators argue that Model Rule 3.6 and its predecessors are vague and overbroad 93 due to an absence of clear work89 See Pfister, supra note 84, at 594 (narrow restraints are needed so that harmless speech "will not be stifled along with the targeted speech").
90 See REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 2, at 179 (Justice Brandeis, in
interpreting the clear and present danger test, "reveal[ed] a clear intention to impose strict requirements concerning both the likelihood and timing of harm that
would flow from any particular speech"); see also Pappas, supra note 36, at 1032
(clear and present danger analysis ensures that trivial interference or prejudice is
insufficient for prohibition of speech).
91 See supra notes 57-83 and accompanying text (discussing various rules promulgated by the ABA).
92 Sallen, supra note 86, at 132 (rules preventing attorney comment are unconstitutional prior restraints because they silence lawyers and prevent the media from
disseminating information to the public). See also Dehryl A. Mason, Note, DR 7107: The ABA's Sanction Against ExtrajudicialStatements by Attorneys, 8 J. LEGAL PROF.
187, 189 (1983) (disciplinary rules are similar to prior restraints because both punish speech using the court's contempt power). But see Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
356, 368 (4th Cir. 1979) (a disciplinary rule is not a prior restraint because a disciplinary rule gives the attorney due process before punishment).
For analysis of prior restraints, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 559-62 (1976) (analyzing prior restraints); BOGEN, supra note 8, at 144-52 (offering analysis of the constitutionality of prior restraints); NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 4.03, at 4-14 (defining prior restraint); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 55 (1984) (defining prior restraint as restraint on "all relevant expression, whether or not fully protected"); Todd, supra note 1, at 1174-87 (examining the effect of gag orders and
history of prior restraint).
93 See generally Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1973) (vagueness); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (overbreadth). In Smith, the Court reversed
a defendant's conviction for a wearing a flag on the rear pocket of his pants, stating
that the law prohibiting such action was vague and did not provide the defendant
with sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct. Smith, 415 U.S. at 568, 582. The
Court noted that the vagueness doctrine required legislatures to create "reasonably
clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' " Id. at 573 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S.
at 108). In Grayned, the Supreme Court found that a noise ordinance was not overbroad because it prohibited "only conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt"
normal school activities. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119. The Court stated that since the
ordinance implicated speech rights, it had to be narrowly tailored and reasonable,
imposing only time, place and manner restraints. Id. at 115-16 (citing Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941)). The Court also opined that vagueness
offended the following principles: 1) insistence that laws offer a "person of ordi-

1426

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1401

able guidelines which forces attorneys
to guess whether a
94
comment is protected or prohibited.
4.

Federal Court of Appeals and State Court Debate

Four notable federal and state court decisions demonstrate
the conflict among courts and bar associations regarding the
proper standard for attorney speech restriction. 95 The Seventh
nary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited;" 2) the desire that laws provide clear standards to avoid "arbitrary and discriminatory
application;" and 3) concern that vague statutes may infringe "sensitive areas of
basic First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 108-09. The Court warned that vague
laws force citizens to unreasonably restrict their conduct to a greater degree than
necessary. Id. at 109. See also In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 625 n.5, 449 A.2d 483, 494
n.5 (1982) (overbreadth doctrine mandates that the least restrictive means be used
to protect the government interest).
For analysis of overbreadth and vagueness doctrines see NIMMER, supra note 4,
§§ 4.1 I[D]-[E] (with respect to First Amendment generally); REDISH, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, supra note 2, at 214 (criticizing Warren and Burger Courts' interpretation of the overbreadth doctrine for failing to account for specific circumstances).
94 See Johnston, supra note 2, at 693 (concluding that the code is frequently
broad and that there is significant possibility that attorney may be disbarred or disciplined for comments that the attorney did not realize were unethical or in violation of a disciplinary rule); Stern, supra note 48, at 116 ("the attempt to define, in
advance, which defense statements should be prohibited according to content results in irreconcilable conflict between vagueness and overbreadth"); Sallen, supra
note 86, at 129 (Rule 3.6 and the substantial likelihood standard fail to distinguish
statements posing a present threat); Mason, supra note 92, at 195 (criticizing DR 7107 for overbreadth); Matheson, supra note 48, at 899 (the reasonable likelihood
standard " 'hangs over [people's] heads like the 'Sword of Damocles' " because it is
uncertain and punishes speech retrospectively rather than addressing the speaker's
actual knowledge); Loder, supra note 58, at 313 (quoting Brodrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)) (criticizing rules for vagueness and lack of clarity); Abel,
supra note 58, at 642 (rules are drafted with "amorphousness and ambiguity that
renders them virtually meaningless"); Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1006
(Rule 3.6 is "insufficiently precise").
But see 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 58, § 3.6:102 (Rule 3.6 contains lists of
particular statements presumed prejudicial and is therefore essentially as certain as
the clear and present danger test); Revised Report ofJudicial Conference Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press - Fair Trial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519, 524
(1980) (the reasonable likelihood test sufficiently "inform[s] attorneys of what they
may and may not say for publication regarding imminent or pending criminal
litigation").
95 See infra notes 96-120 (discussing Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)); Markfield v. Association
of the Bar, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div.) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d
612 (N.Y. 1975); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Hinds, 90
N.J. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982)). For other state and federal decisional law construing disciplinary rules see United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1444 (10th
Cir. 1987) (statement to press that people lied in corruption investigation was not

violation of disciplinary rule 7-107 because no proof of exposure or prejudice was
offered); In re Eisenberg, 423 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Wis. 1988) (holding the reasonable
likelihood standard constitutional and finding remarks prejudicial despite lack of

1992]

COMMENT

1427

Circuit, in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,9 6 evaluated an Illi-

nois District Court rule modeled after ABA Disciplinary Rule 7107. 97 That court, determining that attorney comment could be
restrained only if it posed a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice, 98 held that the reasonable likelihood
standard was unconstitutionally broad.9 9 Judge Swygert, writing
for the court, noted that Sheppard emphasized a trial judge's obligation to ensure a fair trial. 00 The Bauer court interpreted Sheppard as mandating speech restrictions in a particular trial, not all
trials. 0 Recognizing the "checking value"" 2 of free speech and
its usefulness to the accused's defense, the Seventh Circuit rejected any standard which did not approximate the traditional
adverse affect); National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cooperman, 501 N.Y.S.2d 405,
408-09 (App. Div. 1986) (although the reasonable likelihood standard was held
constitutional, the court order was impermissibly overbroad because danger and
lack of other less restrictive alternatives were not proved); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 492 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (prosecutor's statement to
Washington Post merely repeated his in-court statement and was not a violation of
DR 7-107); In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Mont. 1984) (refusing to adopt the
various standards used in other jurisdictions, holding Montana disciplinary rule unconstitutionally overbroad and vague for a failure to adopt any standard); In re
Lasswell, 673 P.2d 855, 858 (Or. 1983) (any disciplinary rule attempting to restrain
speech must consider the lawyer's intent or knowledge in making the comment).
96 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
97 Id. at 247. For text of Rule 7-107, see supra note 67. The Chicago Council of
Lawyers brought an action seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that
the District Court's Local Criminal Rule 1.07 and ABA Disciplinary Rule 7-107
were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id.
98 Id. at 249. The court noted that despite a legitimate and substantial government interest, broad means of serving that interest could not be upheld when less
restrictive means could have been employed. Id. See also Taffy Bagley, Note, Speech
Restriction Must be Narrowly Drawn, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1158, 1168 (1976) (restrictions
should meet due process requirements).
99 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249. The Seventh Circuit explained that attorneys should
be given a test clearly identifying statements that create a serious and imminent
threat to the proper administration of justice. Id. An amorphous phrase such as
'reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial," according to the court, was too broad and offered no such guidance. Id. See David W.
Hipp, Note, Attorney Comment on Pending Trial, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1976)
(concluding that although the Bauer court found the reasonable likelihood test unconstitutional, it failed to significantly change the standard).
I0 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 251.
101 Id. The court quoted Sheppard's declaration that "collaboration between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is
not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures." Id. (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966)). In doing
so, the court misconstrued the Sheppard Court's intent. See supra note 47 and accompanying text for analysis of misinterpretations of Sheppard holding.
102 See generally Blasi, supra note 15 (discussing the important role of free speech
in monitoring government functions).
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clear and present danger analysis.'0 3
In Markfield v. Association of the Bar,10 4 a New York appellate
court dismissed professional misconduct charges against an attorney who made extrajudicial statements during a trial. 10 5
Although the New York disciplinary rule included the reasonable
likelihood standard, the court limited the standard's application
to statements posing a clear and present danger. 10 6 The court
noted that applying a less protective analysis prohibited comment regardless of its actual effect. 0 7 The court stated that its
application of the clear and present danger test fulfilled the rule's
purpose while providing attorneys with adequate notice of prohibited conduct. 0 8
Disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit and the New York appellate court, the Fourth Circuit, in Hirschkop v. Snead" °9 endorsed the reasonable likelihood standard." 0
Relying on
103 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249, 250. In doing so, the court noted that a more restrictive standard could remove an "informed viewpoint" from the public and would
conflict with the "very purpose of the First Amendment." Id. at 259. The court
continued that any other standard would deprive society of a valuable check on the
government, and deprive the accused of a voice to defend his name. Id. at 250.
Some commentators maintain that the Seventh Circuit did not extend its holding far enough because, in allowing some attorney restraint, the court combined a
"good deal of sense with an equal amount of nonsense." Monroe H. Freedman &
Janet Starwood, PriorRestraints on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607, 608 (1977). Noting
that the Sixth Amendment speaks only of the right of the accused and Fifth Amendment only of personal rights, Freedman and Starwood asserted that "[b]y a neat
slight of pen, however, [Judge Swygert] equated the [S]ixth [A]mendment more
broadly with the 'integrity of our system of justice' and concluded that public 'justice is no less important than accused's right to a fair trial.' " Id. (quoting Bauer,
522 F.2d at 250).
For commentary and analysis of the Bauer holding, see generally Bagley, supra
note 98; Hipp, supra note 99; Johnston, supra note 2, at 689-92 (criticizing the Bauer
court for eliminating overbreadth but failing to avoid vagueness by excluding examples of speech posing serious and imminent threat).
104 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div.) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612
(N.Y. 1975).
105 Id. at 84. While acting as defense counsel in a criminal trial, the attorney
participated in a radio panel discussion concerning prison rebellions. Id. The underlying case was People v. Brown and was commonly known as the "Tombs' Riots
Trial." Id.
106 Id. at 84-85. See FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS, supra note 17, at 89
(analyzing the Markfield holding).
107 Markfield, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
108 Id. at 85. The court noted that the purposes of the disciplinary rule were to
notify attorneys of prohibited conduct and protect fair trials without infringing
speech rights. Id.
109 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
110 Id. at 362. PhilipJ. Hirschkop, a Virginia attorney, instituted suit to have Dis-
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Sheppard, the court asserted that, "implicitly if not explicitly," the
Supreme Court ratified a reasonable likelihood standard for attorney disciplinary rules.I I The Fourth Circuit disregarded First
Amendment guarantees as well as overbreadth and vagueness arguments, insisting that no obstacles prevented the termination of
attorney speech rights during a trial. 1 2 In reaching this conclusion, the court misconstrued Sheppard's limited focus, which endorsed remedial action only after publicity appeared

threatening. 113
Observing these conflicting federal holdings, the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted the less protective reasonable likelihood
standard in In re Hinds.'" The New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed with Hirschkop's interpretation of Sheppard and held that a
reasonable likelihood test constitutionally restrained harmful
ciplinary Rule 7-107 of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility declared
an unconstitutional restraint on free speech. Id. The court, applying the reasonable likelihood standard, stated that "the injection of any other standard would
make the prohibition, which is now clear and definite, to some extent unclear and
gray." Id. at 368. The court was divided, however, with one judge concurring,
three judges concurring in part and dissenting in part and three separate opinions.
FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA AcCESS, supra note 17, at 90.
1 11Id. at 370. The court asserted that "the rules would be meaningless if sanctions could be imposed only when the lawyer's published speech creates unremediable prejudice." Id. Instead, the court continued, the rules were designed to
prevent the possibility of a lawyer prejudicing a trial. Id.
112 Id. The court, ignoring First Amendment concerns and the harm of silencing
free expression, stated: "We know of no good reason why the court may not forbid
the lawyer from intentionally creating grave due process problems, and we are unaware of any constitutional requirement that forbids the court from protecting the
integrity of its processes to that extent." Id.
Justices Wintner and Butzner, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that "[tihe difficulty arises from attempting to restrict [F]irst [A]mendment
rights prospectively by using a standard that was formulated for retrospectively
gauging infringements of the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause." Id. at 380.
See also Cole & Spak, supra note 2, at 369 (advocating restraint of participating
attorney's free speech rights because some attorney comment is inherently prejudicial and can be easily prohibited beforehand).
113 See supra note 47 (criticizing the Hirschkop court and other authorities for misinterpreting Sheppard).
114 90 N.J. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982). A press conference was held while the jury
was being empaneled for a murder trial. Id. at 610, 449 A.2d at 486. The defense
attorney characterized the proceedings as a "legalized lynching"; he was charged
with violating the court's disciplinary rule modeled after ABA Disciplinary Rule 7107. Id. at 611, 449 A.2d at 487. In a companion case, the court held that a disciplinary rule prohibiting a former prosecutor from commenting on a criminal case
did not violate his First Amendment rights. In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 654, 449
A.2d 505, 510 (1982). See also DorothyJ. Nemetz, Development, In re Hinds, New
Jersey Establishes a Standardfor Restricting Attorney Speech, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 661
(1983) (in-depth analysis of In re Hinds).
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speech."15 The court conceded that several courts refused to
prohibit attorney speech unless the comment posed a clear and
present threat to justice.' 16 Nevertheless, justifying the court's
acceptance of the reasonable likelihood standard, Justice Handler cited the government's duty to ensure the fair administration
of justice and the attorney's ability to interfere with that obligation.' 7 The court noted that a restriction could be upheld only if
certain basic conditions were met. 118 Stating that speech limitations must promote a significant government interest unrelated
to speech prohibition, the court announced that the restriction
must be no broader than required to protect that interest.11
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court, although adopting the less
protective standard, mitigated the damage to First Amendment
of the standard and enumerating
rights by clarifying the scope
120
consideration.
for
factors
115 In re Hinds, 90 N.J. at 618-620, 449 A.2d at 491-92. The court maintained
power of final review over attorney conduct in New Jersey consistent with the
court's position at the top of New Jersey's three levels of review for unethical conduct charges. Nemetz, supra note 114, at 676-77. The first level consists of local
district ethics committees, the second is a state-wide disciplinary review board with
members appointed by the court. Id. The third level is the court itself, from which
there is no opportunity for appeal. Id.
116 In re Hinds, 90 N.J. at 621, 449 A.2d at 492. See Chicago Council for Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (advocating clear and present danger test),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971) (same);
Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (same); United States v. Garcia,
456 F. Supp. 1354 (D.P.R. 1978) (same); Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 168 (Ct. App.) (same), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
117 In re Hinds, 90 N.J. at 624, 449 A.2d at 494. Justice Handler noted: "While
the administration of criminal justice is a governmental responsibility, it cannot be
accomplished through fiat or authoritarian methods." Id. The court contended
that the proper administration of justice depended on the cooperation of all those
involved in the process. Id. The justice further criticized the clear and present
danger standard because, although appearing to more strictly guard free speech, it
failed to offer more precision or certainty than the reasonable likelihood test. Id. at
622, 449 A.2d at 493. The court cautioned that strictness did not automatically
guarantee greater precision or clarity. Id.
118 Id. at 614, 449 A.2d at 488.
119 Id. Although admitting that the reasonable likelihood test was not as narrowly tailored as the clear and present danger test, the court found that the reasonable likelihood standard was "no broader than necessary" to protect the
government's interest in fair trials. Id. at 623-24, 449 A.2d at 494.
120 Nemetz, supra note 114, at 697. The court articulated several factors for consideration under the reasonable likelihood test: the nature of the comment, the
timing, the extent of publication of the comment, the nature and type of judicial
proceeding and its vulnerability to prejudice, the "attorney's status in the case" and
the attorney's unique position as "an informed and accurate source of information," the effect of uncontrolled speech on the accused's rights and the "integrity of
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Gentile v. State Bar

Recently, the United States Supreme Court, resolving the
disagreement among the lower courts, endorsed a substantial
likelihood standard for regulating attorney extrajudicial comment. 12' In Gentile v. State Bar,122 the Court examined disciplinary
action taken against Gentile, an attorney, for holding a press conference addressing alleged injustices in the prosecution of his cliPrior to the conference, Gentile examined Nevada
ent. 12
Supreme Court Rule 177124 and, accordingly, restricted his comthe proceeding." In re Hinds, 90 N.J. at 622-23, 449 A.2d at 493. The court also
limited its holding to criminal trials. Id. at 635, 449 A.2d at 499.
The court carefully posited that the disciplinary rule only prohibited commentary by attorneys "associated with" a trial. Id. at 627, 449 A.2d at 495. Justice
Handler recommended that in determining a lawyer's association with a trial,
courts utilize a common sense approach. Id. at 628, 449 A.2d at 496. The court
held that an attorney who regularly contributes to the defense of a case and "holds
himself out to be a member of the defense team" is sufficiently "associated with"
the trial and subject to the disciplinary rule. Id. Contemporary commentary suggested that the court's most valuable achievement in In re Hinds was the specific
notice provided to attorneys regarding the "type of behavior ...that is expected of
them by the court" with respect to extrajudicial comment. Nemetz, supra note 114,
at 704.
121 Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2731, 2745 (1991) (ruling that although
a substantial likelihood standard was constitutionally permissible, Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 177, adopting that standard, was unconstitutional due to its misleading
"safe harbor" provision). See Henry J.Reske, Limited Free Speech for Lawyers, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1991, at 22-23 (examining Gentile and itsprogeny).
122 111 S.Ct. 2720 (1991).
123 Id. at 2738-39. Dominic P.Gentile, a criminal defense attorney, held a press
conference to address the indictment of his client, the owner of a safe deposit vault
company, following the theft of cocaine and money from an undercover drug operation. Id. at 2727-28. Preceding the indictment, extensive publicity focused on the
investigation of Gentile's client and two Las Vegas Metropolitan police officers, the
only suspects. Id. at 2727. Six months before trial, after carefully reviewing Nevada's attorney comment rules, Gentile determined that a press conference was
necessary to balance the slanted publicity against his client and to point out the
press's omissions regarding the state's lack of evidence. Id. at 2728, 2729. Petitioner claimed his client was being used as a scapegoat and alleged misconduct on
the part of the prosecutors, the investigators and others involved in the arrest and
indictment. Id. at 2729. Gentile commented solely on evidence against the two
officers, who were exonerated, and on his own client's innocence. Id. Gentile refused to answer questions that could potentially prejudice his client or other parties. Id. at 2730. The State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint against Gentile for
violating Rule 177. Id. at 2723. Gentile argued that he believed his remarks fit
within the exception in Rule 177, coined the "safe harbor provision" by the Court,
which allowed an attorney to "state without elaboration . . .the general nature of
the ...defense." Id. at 2731 (quoting NEv. SuP. CT. R. 177(3)(a)). The Southern
Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State Bar nevertheless recommended a private
reprimand, which was affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Id. at 2723-24. See
Gentile v. State Bar, 787 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990).
124 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 provided:
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ments to criticism of the prosecution's faulty case and the possi1. Notwithstanding the provisions of any contrary statute or rule, a
lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a
substantial likelihood of materially preudicing an adjudicativeproceeding.
2. A statement referred to in subsection 1 ordinarily is likely to have
such an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration,
and the statement relates to:
(a) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity
of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(b) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence
or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a
defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a
statement;
(c) the performance or results of any examination or test or the
refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or
the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be
presented;
(d) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in
incarceration;
(e) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed
create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(f) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless
there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is
merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent
until and unless proven guilty.
3. Notwithstanding subsection I and 2(a-f), a lawyer involved in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(a) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(b) the information contained in a public record;
(c) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the
general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense
involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the
persons involved;
(d) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(e) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto;
(f) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;
and
(g) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the
accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
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bility of police misconduct.' 2 5 Validating ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.6,126 the Court held that a substantial
prejudice warranted restrictions on attorlikelihood of material
27
ney comment. 1
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote distinct
portions of the majority's opinion.128 Despite attorneys' First
Amendment rights and their value as a "check" on government
conduct, the majority promoted restrictions on attorney extraju(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
NEv. SUP. CT. R. 177 (emphasis added).
125 Gentile, Ill S. Ct. at 2729-30. Gentile intended only to refute the publicity

against his client. Id. at 2728. Gentile claimed that the investigation of his client
had affected his client's health and had caused the failure of his business. Id. Criticizing the prosecution's methods, Gentile asserted that the evidence showed his
client was innocent and that the true perpetrator was a police detective cleared by
the police. Id. at 2729. At the conference Gentile made brief opening remarks and
refused to answer several questions that he believed would prejudice his client or
other parties. Id. at 2731. When asked to elaborate on his claims, Gentile stated
that ethics rules forbid further comment: "Last night before I decided I was going
to make a statement, I took a close look at the rules of professional responsibility.
There are things that I can say and there are things that I can't." Id.
126 See supra note 78 for text of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6. Nevada
Court Rule 177 incorporated the substantial likelihood test utilized in Rule 3.6.
See supra note 124 for text of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177.
127 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2738.
128 Id. at 2723. Justice Kennedy, joined by justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
and O'Connor, found Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 void for vagueness and
reversed Gentile's reprimand by the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board and the
Nevada Supreme Court. Id. at 2731, 2736. ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote the remainder of the Court's opinion which held the rule's "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard constitutional. Id. at 2745. The ChiefJustice added that
the restraint in Rule 177 was proper and sufficiently narrow and that attorney comment could be regulated more heavily than press speech due to the attorneys' participation in the trial process. Id. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Souter
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2723.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, framed
the issue as the "constitutionality of a ban on political speech critical of the government and its officials." Id. at 2723-24. Justice Kennedy declared that Nevada's application of the rule did not satisfy the First Amendment. Id. at 2723. Therefore,
according to Justice Kennedy, the state court judgment should not have been affirmed because Gentile's statements did not create a likelihood of material prejudice or any harm sufficient to punish speech. Id. at 2731. Justice O'Connor filed a
separate concurring opinion upholding attorney comment regulation under a less
demanding test for speech restraint due to attorneys' status as officers of the court.
Id. at 2748. Justice O'Connor agreed, however, that Nevada Rule 177's safe harbor
provision was vague and required reversal of the Nevada Supreme Court decision.
Id. at 2749. ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented, positing that Rule 177 was not overbroad or vague and was validly interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court. Id.
2747. The Chief Justice deferred to the Nevada Bar and courts that were in the
best position to evaluate prejudicial effect. Id. Justices White, Scalia and Souter
joined ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent. Id. at 2723.
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dicial comment. 29 Justice Kennedy authored a reversal of Gentile's reprimand, holding Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 void
for vagueness due to its misleading "safe harbor provision. "130
Chief Justice Rehnquist endorsed the substantial likelihood standard adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court,' 3' emphasizing the
importance of impartial juries. 32 The Court noted that Sixth
Amendment fair trial guarantees may override
First Amendment
33
rights of access to criminal proceedings.1
ChiefJustice Rehnquist framed the issue as whether attorney
speech may be regulated more strenuously than that of other citizens. 1 34 Justifying disparate treatment of attorneys, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist distinguished lawyers, as officers of the court, from ordinary citizens. 3 The Court posited that an attorney's increased
skill and access to information may unduly influence prospective
jurors.1 36 The Chief Justice held that the substantial likelihood
129 Id. at 2742-43. The Court noted that it was an attorney's "professional mission" to criticize government misuse of power. Id. at 2732.
130 Id. at 2731. The safe harbor provision was found in Rule 177(3). See supra
note 124 for text of Rule 177. Justice Kennedy asserted that the safe harbor provision "misled" Gentile because, when read literally, it permitted the comments Gentile made in his press conference. Gentile, Ill S. Ct. at 2731. The majority focused
on the grammatical structure of the section and the use of the words "elaboration"
and "general nature of the defense," which Justice Kennedy deemed insufficient
guides to permissible speech. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that the safe harbor provision explicitly protected statements "notwithstanding" the prohibitions
listed elsewhere in the rule, further confusing the rule's mandate. Id.
131 Id. at 2738.
132 Id. at 2742. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the criminal justice system
relied on impartial jurors who "know as little as possible of the case, based on
material admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding." Id.
'33 Id. at 2745. Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the importance of both
rights but noted that in the courtroom, attorney speech rights were "extremely circumscribed." Id. at 2743.
134 Id. at 2742-43.
135 Id. at 2744. The Court relied on several earlier cases regulating attorney
speech and conduct more closely than ordinary citizens' rights. Id. at 2743-44. See,
e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (subordinating litigants'
First Amendment rights to other interests arising at trial); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S.
622 (1959) (holding lawyers subject to ethical restrictions on speech that could not
constitutionally be applied to ordinary citizens); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1
(1952) (permitting an attorney in a criminal trial to speak or act freely only to the
extent necessary to preserve an appeal); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949) (applying Sacher principle to civil trials). Cf Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n, 110 S.Ct. 2281 (1990) (First Amendment protected attorney advertisement on letterhead regarding qualifications); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978) (bar association can discipline lawyers for solicitation of clients
despite First Amendment rights); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney
advertising deemed a protected First Amendment right).
136 Gentile, Il1 S. Ct. at 2745. See also In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 627, 449 A.2d 483,
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standard palliated jury prejudice and
constitutionally balanced
7
First and Sixth Amendment rights.'

Dismissing procedural methods such as voir dire and change
of venue as unduly costly to the judicial system, the Court
deemed disciplinary rules a more feasible and efficient solution. ' 38 The Court noted that the rules did not completely restrain speech but only required that attorneys wait until after trial
to comment.' 39 Therefore, although the Court absolved Gentile,
its holding withdrew traditional speech protection and removed
an influential voice from the "marketplace of ideas."' 4 °
496 (1982) (emphasizing the attorney's ability to interfere with the fair administration of justice); In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 656, 449 A.2d 505, 511 (1982) (same).
137 Gentile, Ill S. Ct. at 2745. The Chief Justice noted that when legislation
threatens First Amendment rights, a reviewing court must balance those rights
against the state interest being forwarded. Id. The substantial likelihood test, according to ChiefJustice Rehnquist, satisfied this requirement by protecting the "integrity and fairness" of the trial process. Id. Additionally, the Chief Justice
asserted that the legitimate state interest was furthered with minimal speech restraint. Id.
138 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177
narrowly restrained the evils of publicity without extinguishing attorneys' First
Amendment rights. Id. The Court credited the disciplinary rule with ameliorating
two "principal evils": 1) comments that could influence the trial result, and
2) comments that risk prejudicing the jury venire, even if an impartial jury panel is
ultimately assembled. Id.
139 Id. The Chief Justice commended the rule's narrow scope, which did not forbid speech entirely, and limited the speech of all participating attorneys equally,
irrespective of content. Id.
140 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-7 (1989).
Baker discussed the market place of ideas theory and its three assumptions:
1) "truth must be 'objective' or 'discoverable' "; 2) people are able to accurately
recognize truth and reality; and 3) "discovery of truth must be desirable" to encourage action and human interest. See supra note 2 for resources discussing the
marketplace of ideas theory and the need for numerous and varied informational
sources. See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 355 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("A free press is vital to a democratic society because its freedom gives
it power."); Tuite, supra note 81, at 140 (Gentile presented the Supreme Court with
its first opportunity to decide if the First Amendment protected attorney comment
during trial to the same degree it protected advertising).
For post-Gentile cases demonstrating the scope of attorneys' First Amendment
rights, see Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137 (3d
Cir. 1991) (statements made during judicial candidacy could constitutionally be
prohibited but only narrowly under specific circumstances); United States v. Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (defense attorneys sanctioned for
comments violating serious and imminent threat standard); In re Holtzman, 577
N.E.2d 30 (N.Y.) (per curiam) (finding that statements to media alleging judicial
wrongdoing warranted reprimand), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991); In re Westfall,
808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo.) (affirming disciplinary sanction for television statement,
made with reckless disregard for the truth, charging court of appeals judge with
purposefully dishonest conduct), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). Cf Marcia
Chambers, Bars Sanction Lawyers Who FaultJudges, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 13
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Justice Kennedy dissented with respect to the substantial
likelihood standard, however, reminding his colleagues of precedential mandates that attorney disciplinary rules could not disclaim First Amendment guarantees.' 4 1 Justice Kennedy averred
that attorneys' informed and persuasive comments are valuable
expressions protected by the First Amendment regardless of
their "power to command assent. "142
Unlike his colleagues, Justice Kennedy adhered to consistent
First Amendment protection which allowed only minimal restraints on speech when absolutely necessary.' 4 ' Ambivalent to
Justice Kennedy's concerns, the majority weakened attorneys'
First Amendment right to speak and the public's First Amend44
ment right to gather accurate information. 1
PART II

Facing the threat of disciplinary action, an attorney will err
on the side of silence. 1 45 Suppression of extrajudicial comment
not only deprives society of valuable information but impairs an
attorney's obligation to expose judicial abuse and to effectively
advocate.' 4 6 Vague disciplinary rules sacrifice First Amendment
(criticizing actions taken in Holtzman and Westfall); Reske, supra note 121, at 22-23
(reviewing the holdings in Holtzman and Westfall).
141 Gentile, 11l S. Ct. at 2734.
142 Id. at 2735. Justice Kennedy warned that the dangers arising from the authoritativeness and persuasiveness of attorney comment resulted from the attorney's
ability to understand and explain judicial proceedings. Id. The probability that the
public would believe the attorney's speech, according to Justice Kennedy, did not
justify restraints on speech. Id. See also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978)
("Free trade in ideas means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not
merely to describe facts.").
143 Id. at 2734-35. Justice Kennedy noted that pretrial publicity rarely affected
trials and that studies proved jurors could disregard publicity in reaching a verdict.
Id. at 2734.
144 See infra notes 148-61 for discussion of the value of First Amendment rights
to society.
145 See Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1029 ("it would indeed be a rare and
unique individual who would not choose to err on the side of caution," particularly
considering the lack of penalty for failing to keep the public informed). Threat of
self-censorship demands a high degree of precision when attorney speech is regulated. Id. See also Loder, supra note 58, at 314 (the threat of sanctions may silence
lawyers); Schwab, supra note 3, at 27 (advising lawyers never to hold a press conference because there are too many uncontrollable variables; "no attorney of any degree of competence would knowingly permit himself and his firm to be placed in
such an uncontrollable situation").
146 See Emerson, supra note 1, at 881 (society needs to gather information from
many sources, particularly the most informed and persuasive sources); Swift, Restraints,supra note 38, at 71-75 (detailing society's interests in the judicial process
and the evils of secrecy).
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rights without substantial evidence that attorney comment
prejudices the trial process or that disciplinary rules actually cure
the harm.

A.

14 7

Damage to Society

Courts should protect an attorney's out-of-court statements
as jealously as the Court has protected the public's right to receive information regarding criminal trials. 14 Attorney comment enables the public to monitor governmental conduct and to
advocate reform. 149 Freedom to speak and to gather information
through the speech of others ensures the proper administration
of justice.' 5' Amorphous disciplinary rules expunge these
147 See Vermont Royster, The Free Press and a Fair Trial, 43 N.C. L. REV. 364, 366
(1965) (in contrast to traditional speech crimes such as defamation and libel where
government action is taken only after harm results, disciplinary rules punish speech
before any damage occurs); Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1049 (the possibility of harm to a trial is a "matter of conjecture and speculation," and therefore does
not warrant broad restrictions on free speech).
148 See supra notes 20-41 and accompanying text (discussing Bridges, Pennekamp,
Sawyer and Nebraska). One commentator acknowledged that "the operation of the
judicial branch of government is emphatically the public's business" and limitations
on the information available to the public for reviewing that process should be
made only narrowly. Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1006. The right to monitor judicial processes includes not only the right to physically attend trials but also
to gather information from other sources relating to court proceedings. Id. at 1011
(citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980)). Therefore, information sources for people unable to physically view the trial should not
be silenced. Id. See also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575 (few other aspects of
government are of "higher concern and importance to the people than the manner
in which criminal trials are conducted"); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948)
(publicity provides the only sufficient "check" on government); NIMMER, supra note
4, § 4.09[B] (analyzing the right to gather information); Blasi, supra note 15, at 552
(free speech and access to information is essential to monitor government and judicial conduct); REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 2, at 41-42 (criticizing
Blasi for protecting too much speech under the checking value theory).
149 Lewis, supra note 12, at 796-97 (due to the complexity and size of our government, greater scrutiny is required to detect and stop abuse); Royster, supra note
147, at 364 (the Sixth Amendment was intended to protect the public from arbitrary government acts and unrestrained access to and comment on judicial proceedings deters such arbitrary acts against citizens); Todd, supra note 1, at 1207
(concluding that overbroad restraints on information sources could subvert society's ability to check judicial integrity).
150 See Meiklejohn, supra note 12, reprinted in REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
supra note 2, at 75 (First Amendment rights should be unqualified because ensuring
the proper administration ofjustice requires that members of society: 1) comprehend problems confronting the nation; 2) judge decisions made by government
officials and 3) share in the decision-making process to ensure the best decisions
are made and effectuated). But see REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 2,
at 205 for criticism of Meiklejohn's theory.
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freedoms. 5 '
Forcing attorneys to remain silent or risk sanctions under
vague and unpredictable rules deprives the public of its most
perceptive informational source regarding trials. 5 2 Although
the press reports trial details, lawyers explain their significance
and detect iniquities. 53 Attorney criticism must be offered at 54a
time when public attention is focused on the events involved.
In the absence of attorney comment, uninformed media speculation and misinterpretation remain the only source of
information. 155
Moreover, the necessity of lawful convictions, not based on
151 See supra note 145 (asserting that disciplinary rules punish speech before any
showing of harm can be made).
152 See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 259 (7th Cir. 1975)
(disciplinary rules remove "[a]n informed viewpoint . . . from the public forum
without justification" in violation of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976); NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.02[B], at 1-13 (cautioning that the people are the
backbone of democracy and must be enlightened "by those who are informed" to
ensure the proper administration ofjustice); Freedman & Starwood, supra note 103,
at 613 (the press is necessary to guard against abuse of the judicial system and will
not be able to fulfill that goal if the most knowledgeable sources of information are
"silenced at the very moment at which they have the greatest incentive to protest");
Lewis, supra note 12, at 797 (right to scrutinize government action is essential to
exercising First Amendment rights because public debate must be informed).
153 See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250 (lawyers are one of the most valuable sources of
information because they are perceived as credible and knowledgeable); Stern,
supra note 48, at 112 (defense counsel is in the best position to "explain the proceedings, and articulate the defense perspective"); Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note
2, at 1013 (the defense attorney is the best source of trial information and reveals
possible abuses); Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 79 (silencing the defendant deprives the public of the voice which has the strongest interest in reforming abuse).
But see Cole & Spak, supra note 2, at 377 (because the attorney is the most knowledgeable and influential source of information, attorney comments unduly influence the public and should be silenced; no harm would result because many other
voices remain).
154 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1976). Delay harms the
public interest. Id. at 561. "[M]oreover, the element of time is not unimportant if
press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of bringing news to the public
promptly." Id. See Blasi, supra note 15, at 553 (communication is most essential
when "the public is first made aware of what is going on"); John Kaplan, Of Babies
and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REV. 621, 622 (1977) (unrestrained press and speech
during the Watergate crisis prevented information from losing its newsworthiness
and impact); Matheson, supra note 48, at 924 (requiring that speech be made after
trial permits governmental destruction of the speech's immediacy and ultimate impact); Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1014 (trials in the public eye allow
attorneys to advocate reform not only to fellow lawyers but also to the public when
public attention is at its peak).
155 See Sallen, supra note 86, at 135 (silencing attorneys deprives the media of its
most knowledgeable source and handicaps the media's efforts, limiting the public's
opportunity to scrutinize judicial processes).
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illegally seized evidence, coerced confessions or prejudiced juries

overrides society's interest in punishing the guilty. 15 6 Allowing
the government to convict a guilty man by unconstitutional
means condones the government's use of those same methods to
imprison an innocent man.1 57 Unrestrained criticism of judicial
proceedings ensures that all participants defend the truth.' 5 8
Finally, insightful comment educates the public and fosters judicial respect. 159 Scarcity of attorney comment undermines faith in

the judicial process. 160

Silence breeds ignorance, fear and

mistrust. 161
B.

Damage to Attorneys

Attorneys are citizens with the First Amendment right to
speak. 16 2 Regulating speech because its source retains more
163
knowledge draws an absurd and unconstitutional distinction.
Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 107-08.
See id.
Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1012-13. See supra note 2 (demonstrating
the importance of numerous sources for effective information gathering).
159 See Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 71-72 (knowledge that participants in the
judicial process are being monitored by the public checks the abuse of power).
Public monitoring of judicial processes ensures that possible abuses arising when
prosecutors and police are under pressure are stopped before they harm the innocent. Royster, supra note 147, at 369-70. "There are, indeed, a hundred ways in
which justice can be and sometimes is debauched by those whose job it is to serve
it." Id. at 369.
160 See Matheson, supra note 48, at 883-84 (silencing comment about judicial
processes could have a "detrimental effect" on public confidence); Cynthia M.
Nakao, Casenote, Gag Me with a Prior Restraint: A Chilling Effect That Sends Shivers
Down the Spines of Attorneys and the Mledia, 7 Lov. ENT. L.J. 353, 353 (1987) (prohibiting media access to information about the court system would "increase the public's ignorance and distrust of the legal system").
161 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
162 Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979); Royster, supra note
147, at 366. Blackstone asserted that every man possessed the right to "lay what
sentiments he pleases" in the public forum. Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 151-52). Royster added that if every man possessed this right then
it should not be a privilege for some and denied to others. Id. "[A]nything that
abridges the right for any man-even a muddleheaded editor-abridges the right
for all men." Id. But see Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 366 (adding that First Amendment
rights for members of the bar include certain responsibilities; guidelines must be
established to ensure responsible use of speech rights).
163 See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 259 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Pappas, supra note 36, at 1037 (proposing that
litigants' First Amendment rights should not be limited, for if they were so limited,
the government could silence a citizen simply by dragging him into court); Royster,
supra note 147, at 366 (the probability that an expression will be "mischievous in its
effects, be it on a great matter of [sitate or on a county trial for poaching," does not
156
157
158
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Nebulous restraints on attorney comment, lacking clear guidelines, regulate speech because of its source, not its effect. 164 Disciplinary rules therefore encourage silence, more often
eliminating productive rather than prejudicial speech.' 6 5 These
rules may punish an attorney despite the attorney's conscientious
attempt to balance the right to speak against the amorphous
1 66
probability of harm created by that speech.
The Gentile standard fosters self-censorship because it prevents potential harm, not actual harm.' 6 7 Forced forfeiture of
First Amendment rights, therefore, compromises an attorney s
professional and civic duty to criticize injustice. 6 8 An attorney
must be free to criticize a rule or statute that is or has become
oppressive.' 69 Attorneys must also be permitted to question devious trial tactics. 170 Without this speech, a citizen loses funda17 1
mental rights and society loses an informed voice.
Several courts have justified disparate treatment of attorneys' First Amendment rights by referring to an attorneys' perceived status as an "instrument of justice.' 1 72 This disparate
justify silencing expression); Panel Discussion, lValking the Line Between Free Press and
Fair Trial (pt. 1), 125 N.J.L.J. 1365 (1990) (panel discussion addressing police susceptibility to Rule 3.6). These commentaries highlight the pointlessness of restraining attorney comment when other parties with the same information are
permitted to disseminate prejudicial information and create the same danger.
164 Sallen, supra note 86, at 128. Any ordinary citizen acquiring the same information as the participating attorney could publish it, possibly with less accuracy,
and not be sanctioned.
165 Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1016 (the rules are "likely to prevent
speech under circumstances where no harm will result"); Sallen, supra note 86, at
133 (attorneys, fearing sanctions, will remain silent despite the possibility that their
speech may never be harmful); Stern, supra note 48, at 118 (the self-censorship
fostered by the disciplinary rules "creates a vastly more inclusive ban on protected
speech" than narrowly tailored prior restraints).
166 Id.
167 See supra notes 164-65 (discussing the inability of vague standards to prohibit
only harmful speech).
168 Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 67; Pappas, supra note 36, at 1022. See Abel,
supra note 58, at 671 (an attorney has various obligations to society, to the adversary and to third parties, and cannot disregard these duties to pursue personal interests); Sallen, supra note 86, at 138 (disciplinary rules hinder the representation of
a client and interfere with the public's information gathering process).
169 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 253 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
170 See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 103, at 616 (an attorney must be permitted to attack injustice within a particular case and counter the prosecutor's
allegations).
171 See id. (an attorney has First Amendment rights that are vital to society's information gathering process).
172 See Gentile v. State Bar, Ill S. Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991) (detailing the historical
regulation of attorneys on the basis of their special status and expressing the major-

19921

COMMENT

1441

treatment, however, cannot be justified unless the attorney, as an
officer of the court, committed some impropriety that was inconsistent with this role. 173 An attorney cannot be deprived of these
rights simply because a lawyer serves as an officer of the court.' 74
ity's acceptance of the substantial likelihood test for attorney comment rules); In re
Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 615, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (1982) (discussing attorneys' special
status and essential function in the trial process). See also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S.
622, 666 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Ecclesiastes, 3:1 V7 stating that
there is a "time to keep silence and a time to speak," in support of the argument
that attorneys may be regulated because of the importance of their function in the
judicial system and the need to maintain order); Revised Report of the JudicialConference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press - Fair Trial" Issue, 87
F.R.D. 519, 527 (1980) (courts not only have the power to regulate attorneys but
have a duty to do so under the Sheppard holding). But see Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 273334 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting officer of the court justification for
the argument that attorneys should be subject to more restrictions than other
citizens).
173 Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 82; Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at
1027-28. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 393 (1962) (a sheriff, despite his
status as an officer of the court, could not be reprimanded for his comments regarding judicial conduct because there was no showing that this status contributed
to a substantial likelihood of harm); Pappas, supra note 36, at 1028 (commenting on
Wood and stating that, without additional justification, attorneys could not constitutionally be regulated merely because they were officers of the court).
Courts have recognized the power to regulate attorney speech in other contexts, but only when the attorney spoke as an officer of the court and not as an
ordinary citizen. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (acknowledging
attorneys' historical status as officers of the court subject to state regulation but
upholding an attorney's free speech right to solicit a client for the American Civil
Liberties Union). Those courts recognize the difference between speech which
abuses the attorney's position within the court, such as inflammatory or untrue
statements made during court proceedings, and those statements made outside the
courtroom in the capacity of an observer to the process who happens to have extraordinary ties to the proceedings. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643, 646-47
(1985) (noting that courts have the power to regulate an attorney who acts on behalf of the court, but protecting an attorney's right to criticize the administration of
the Criminal Justice Act). The Snyder Court recognized that an attorney, like other
citizens, was free to advocate change and was most motivated to do so when specifically interested in the topic. Id. at 644. See Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at
1028 (an attorney has significant professional obligations beyond those within the
courtroom and cannot be prohibited from fulfilling these obligations simply because he is a participant in a trial); Pappas, supra note 36, at 1039 (attorneys' status
within the judicial system should not prohibit attorneys from exercising First
Amendment rights common to all citizens); Swartz, supra note 16, at 1429 (arguing
that the speaker's status should not justify specialized treatment because it is the
content of the speech that is purported to cause harm);
174 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 636 (1959). See supra note 30-34 and accompanying text (analysis of Sawyer). See National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 501
N.Y.S.2d 405, 408 (App. Div. 1986) (while attorneys have certain professional obligations, these obligations do not require that lawyers "surrender their [F]irst
[A]mendment rights"). See also Sallen, supra note 86, at 130 (attorney status as officer of the court does not justify special treatment because other public officers
have obligations to the court and do not suffer restrictions on speech rights). But
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An attorney, unlike another court officer who is merely a
court employee, has obligations that are on occasion contrary to
those of the court or the prosecution. 1 75 Thus, presumptively labeling attorneys as agents of the court and subjecting attorney
expression to different and more exacting scrutiny ignores their
176
duty to prevent abuse within the judicial system.
C.

Harm to the Defendant

An accused, like all other citizens, possesses a First Amendment right of free expression. 1 77 A defendant is therefore entitled to attack abuses and is most motivated to do so when they
prejudice his own case.' 78 The accused often, however, remains
silent, because he fears self-incrimination or because physical insee Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2742-43 (stating that attorneys deserve the same fundamental rights as all other citizens but cautioning that their status as officers of the court
subjects these rights to some conditions).
175 Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1027. Swift claimed that it is not the
status of the speaker that must be considered but the "special needs of the environment in which [the speaker] operates or exists," and that the regulation should be
"limited to the furtherance of those needs." Id. at 1024. Swift also argued, in accord with many other commentators, that prosecutors, who act directly for the government, should be more easily restrained than defense counsel, who act on behalf
of an outsider opposing the state. Id. at 1005 n.13. Swift explicated that defense
counsel and prosecutors differ because: 1) prosecutorial comment hinders government duty to provide fair trials; 2) prosecutors share the government's duty to be
impartial; and 3) prosecutors do not have the same need to protect the accused or
the public from abuse of the system. Id. See also FREEDMAN, PRESS AND MEDIA AcCESS, supra note 17, at 92, 101 n.22 (ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press acknowledge the differences between defense counsel and prosecutors by
specifically addressing prosecutors in Standard 3-1.3); Matheson, supra note 48, at
868-69 (prosecutors more readily violate comment rules and their statements are
more likely to prejudice jurors); Stern, supra note 48, at 113 (the prosecutor has
obligations ofjustice to the accused and to the public while defense counsel represents only the accused); Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 83 (prosecutorial status as
a government official does not "justify total elimination of [the prosecutor's] free
speech rights, it does create considerations not applicable to the defense attorney";
the government has a greater obligation to be impartial than defense counsel);
Blodgett, Equal Access, supra note 3, at 29 (citing a report by the Federal Bar Council
Committee on Second Circuit Courts which recommended speech prohibitions for
the prosecution only); Nancy Blodgett, Press Sensitive, Prosecutors' Use of Media Hit,
A.B.A.J., Dec. 1985, at 17 (discussing prosecutorial use of the media); Panel Discussion, supra, note 163, at 1365 (prosecutors feel immune to Rule 3.6).
176 Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1027-28.
177 See Stern, supra note 48, at 98-99 (the free press and fair trial issue is triangular, with the press, the government and the defendant asserting competing interests
that are all affected by publicity or restraint of publicity).
178 See Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 66 ("a citizen who is silenced at the verv
time the government is bringing criminal charges against him sustains a considerably greater personal loss than does the press").
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carceration precludes communication with the public or press. 17 9
An accused must therefore exercise First Amendment rights
through an attorney who can distinguish helpful and incriminating comments. 'o
To be publicly vindicated, a defendant should be permitted
to expose judicial abuse, if necessary, risking forfeiture of Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial.' 8 ' The public indictment is
analogous to a libel against the accused. 18 2 The defendant
should be able to challenge the indictment or to instruct his
counsel to do so.'8 3 If the defendant is deprived of this opportunity, the defendant's name may be irreversibly tarnished, his rela179 Freedman & Starwood, supra note 103, at 614 (the defendant may not have
access to the press because bail is usually high in the most publicized cases,
preventing the defendant from getting out of jail; therefore the defendant must
"rely on those 'outside' " to speak for him); Stern, supra note 48, at 112 (the "accused may be detained, or otherwise unable to speak, and there may be no one else
able to speak" for the accused). See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975) (a defendant should rely on his counsel's experience and
expertise to publicly refute accusations), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
180 Id. The Bauer court argued against attorney comment restraints claiming that
the lawyer may be the client's most effective and perhaps only public advocate. Id.
The court posited that a lawyer was usually "more articulate and more knowledgeable in the law than the accused, [and could] perhaps best speak about such matters
as defenses or the reputation of the accused as a law abiding citizen." Id. See
Freedman & Starwood, supra note 103, at 614 (an attorney is a more competent
voice "than the involved, unsophisticated and inarticulate client"); Robert P. Isaacson, Fair and Free Press: An Opportunity for Coexistence, 29 STAN. L. REv. 561, 568
(1977) (no comment rules frustrate the accused's right to protect himself and the
fairness of the proceedings; the rules also 1) allow law enforcement agencies to
self-regulate; 2) leave abuse of the system undetected; and 3) recommend use of
contempt power against press); Royster, supra note 147, at 369 (a defendant should
not suffer in silence); Stern, supra note 48, at 112 ("someone must decide which
facts can be safely disclosed," and the defendant's lawyer is in the best position to
determine what information should be released); Sallen, supra note 86, at 139 (an
attorney may be the only party understanding the issues involved and prepared to
speak for the defendant without incriminating him).
181 See Stern, supra note 48, at 109 ("the Sixth Amendment's guarantee protects
many of the interests implicated by a defendant's right to protest").
182 See Blodgett, Equal Access, supra note 3, at 29 (the prosecutor monopolizes the
public's knowledge with an indictment, stacking the deck against the accused who
needs a knowledgeable and skilled voice to publicly defend him); Freedman &
Starwood, supra note 103, at 611 (despite the presumption of innocence, "the impact of an indictment upon the general public is so great that few defendants will be
able to overcome it"); Weaver, supra note 84, at 514 (the government does not have
a right to a fair trial and the power of the public indictment should be balanced by
allowing defense counsel to publicly rebut that indictment).
183 Stern, supra note 48, at 98-99 (the defendant has a legitimate interest in publicly responding even when the media publicizes only the indictment or arrest);
Pappas, supra note 36, at 1037 (the defendant should be entitled through counsel to
rebut government accusations).
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tions with family and friends affected, his career compromised
and his reputation and respect within the community destroyed.' 8 4 The charges, arrest and indictment create prejudice
against the accused because society imbues officials with trust
and confidence and generally mistrusts anyone accused of a
crime.'8 5
Any highly publicized case amply demonstrates this potential
bias.'8 6 Consider for example the recent acquittal of William
Kennedy Smith. 8 7 Few, if any, are unfamiliar with the rape
charges brought against William Kennedy Smith; this familiarity
is due to the extensive media coverage. 8 Mr. Smith's future
medical career was jeopardized because potential patients will re184 Chicago Council for Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). See Stern, supra note 48, at 98 (the accusations are
often accepted as true by the "uninformed citizen" thus damaging the accused's
reputation); Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 80 (a defendant's public response to
allegations against him is not always intended to interfere with the trial process but
may be the only opportunity for "obtaining justice, or reducing the stigmatization
of himself and his family, of offsetting community bias, of raising funds to defend
himself or of participating in important public discussion and convincing his fellows
that his acts were morally, if not legally, blameless").
185 Id. at 77, 95. See Isaacson, supra note 180, at 573 (concluding that courts
should allow defense attorneys to make public statements in cases of extreme publicity to protect the defendant).
186 Stem, supra note 48, at 98 ("the most pressing need for exposure arises in the
sensationalized case," because the press reports regardless of the cooperation of
officials). See infra note 187 and accompanying text regarding the rape trial of William Kennedy Smith.
187 See Fred Strasser, No Fair Trial, Poll: Publicity Skews Palm Beach Rape Case, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 12, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Strasser, No Fair Trial]. Strasser reported that
a poll revealed that public awareness of the William Kennedy Smith trial was so
great that while 85% of Palm Beach residents admitted having knowledge of the
trial this was only 7% greater than the number of people in the rest of the nation
who were aware of the trial. Id. at 44. Strasser also indicated that 65% of those
answering the poll said that the judge should restrict attorney speech regarding the
trial. Id. The study also demonstrated, however, that although respondents agreed
that publicity affected the trial, 80% of the potential jurors in Palm Beach claimed
they could serve impartially despite their awareness of the publicity. Id.
The Kennedy Smith trial involved hoards of media representatives, evoking a
picture similar to that described in Sheppard. John Taylor, Men on Trial I: The Palm
Beach Rape Case is the Latest Skirmish on the Sexual Battlefield: Will Men or Women Define
the Reality of How They Treat Each Other?, NEW YORK, Dec. 16, 1991, at 22, 23. See
supra note 46 for description of publicity in Sheppard. The difference between Sheppard's trial and Kennedy Smith's trial was that, in the latter, Judge Mary Lupo controlled the press and public at Smith's trial without depriving either the press or the
public of the ability to view and criticize the trial and its administration. See also
Fred Strasser, Venue Move For Smith Rejected, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at 5 (trial
court denied defense motion for change of venue stating that publicity did not warrant the removal).
188 See supra note 187 (discussing William Kennedy Smith's trial).
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fuse to employ Smith's medical services, fearing the allegations
were true.' 89 Despite the acquittal, irreparable harm was
wrought to the accused's name and reputation. 190 A defendant
must be allowed, amidst the controversy, to offer his version to
the public, asking for sympathy and trust just as the prosecutor
asks the public to believe the assertion that this is the guilty
man. 191

Further, numerous other sources uncontrolled by attorney
comment rules compound the publicity spurred by the indictment. 192 Court personnel, police and the press may not be gov189 Despite the fact that William Kennedy Smith was acquitted, over 80% of the
nation is aware that he was once accused of rape. Strasser, No Fair Trial, supra note
187, at 44. At least a portion of that 80% will hesitate before hiring Smith for
medical care and without Smith's ability to publicly refute the charges, either directly or through his attorney, that number would be greater.
190 See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 103, at 613 ("entirely apart from the
proceedings in court, the good name earned during a lifetime can be demolished").
See also Matheson, supra note 48, at 884-85 (even the presumption of innocence and
an eventual acquittal do not protect the accused from damage to reputation and
invasion of privacy); Marcus, supra note 6, at 265-76 (analyzing publicity effects on
defendant's privacy and rehabilitation).
191 See Royster, supra note 147, at 369 (due to the lengthy trial process in
America, silencing a defendant throughout that process would be a "total curtain of
silence under which many unfortunate men would be buried"). Royster, a Wall
Street Journaleditor, emphasized the importance of an accused's use of First Amendment rights to defend himself publicly against allegations of criminal conduct by
personalizing the problem:
I, for one man, would shudder at the prospect of being charged
with some crime, especially one of moral turpitude, and being condemned to suffer silence until some distant day when even an acquittal would not be recompense. And what I shudder at for myself I
would not wish upon any man. The history of the law means nothing
if it does not mean that each man should be treated as we would be
done by.
Id.
See also Stern, supra note 48, at 53. As an example, Stern detailed the Willie
Sanders rape case in Boston. Id. at 55-61 Public pressure led to the arrest, indictment and trial of Sanders despite a lack of evidence and improperly obtained faulty
identifications by victims. Id. at 57. The victims were shown either only one photo
or photos which suggested the accused as the perpetrator. Id. at 57-58. Most victims could not identify Sanders with certainty and the detectives made false and
misleading statements in court. Id. at 60-61. Stern credited the defense's public
campaign on behalf of Sanders with generating public awareness of the injustices
inflicted upon Sanders and leading to Sanders' acquittal. Id. at 68-74.
192 See Charles Garry & Dennis Riordan, Gag Orders: Cui Bono?, 29 STAN. L. REV.
575, 578-79 (1977) (regulating participants or press does not silence bailiffs, court
personnel or courthouse rumor). See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 199 (1957) (admitting that negative publicity disadvantages a defendant); Blodgett, Press Sensitive, supra note 175, at 17 (the prosecutor
expresses opinions regarding the defendant's guilt merely by issuing and defending
the indictment with statements that "are not even qualified as opinion" and may
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erned by disciplinary rules. 93 The press often aggravates
pretrial publicity when attempting to reap the financial benefits
of public interest.194 Neither an acquittal months or years later
nor a bare denial of the allegations will vindicate the accused.' 9 5
Defense counsel, a knowledgeable and skilled source, must pro96
tect the name of the defendant against public accusations.
mislead a public which trusts its officials and equates an indictment with guilt);
Isaacson, supra note 180, at 569 (the court cannot control all sources of publicity
and, additionally, the police, court personnel or the prosecution may violate a restrictive order and disseminate information); Stern, supra note 48, at 104 (the court
cannot control "the victim's sympathizers" or the press who may express opinions
on the case); Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 76 (even without contributions from
the prosecution, the press may continue to level accusations against the accused).
193 Panel Discussion, Supra note 163, at 1365.
194

See

DAVID

J.

BODENHAMER,

FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN

HISTORY 92-93 (1992) (describing the Scottsboro Case, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932), in which young black males were accused of raping a white girl and their
trial was "a legal sham" with poor lawyers provided for defense; once media were
involved, the case garnered support from NAACP and Communist party, and conviction was reversed on appeal because of ineffective representation); Stern, supra
note 48, at 70-71 (the press's policies for reporting the Willie Sanders case were
"entirely consistent with the assumption which underlay the initial coverage of the
arrest-that the issue of guilt had already been satisfactorily resolved"). Trials involving celebrities or individuals in the public eye generate inordinate amounts of
media coverage as the public becomes fascinated with the events. For example, one
reporter described the William Kennedy Smith rape trial as a "truly astonishing
spectacle." Taylor, supra note 187, at 25. The press overwhelmed the courtroom,
court house and surrounding area, recording the "parade of Kennedys" attending
the trial and reporting the trivial anecdotes of the trial itself as intently as the legal
issues involved. Id. The press recorded in great detail the "stiff, sour prosecutor,"
the "judge with her thickly lipsticked and strangely pursed lips," the reactions of a
juror's spouse after learning she would be separated from her husband for the
three weeks of the trial, as well as the number of glasses of water that Judge Mary
Lupo drank during the trial. Id. Public interest in well-known citizens motivates
the press to go beyond mere reporting of evidence to critique not only the believability of the testimony but the personal characteristics of the participants and spectators as well.
195 Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 76 (the defendant cannot rely on an acquittal
at the end of trial because by that time public interest has subsided and the public
often believes the original accusations despite the acquittal, suspecting that the defendant was freed on a technicality).
196 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)). See Blodgett, EqualAccess, supra note 3, at 29 (without
reliance on counsel, wealthier defendants may seek the assistance of consultants or
public relations firms which disadvantages the indigent accused and permits restrictions of free speech according to wealth); Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 78 (in
the case of less wealthy defendants who are wrongly accused, publicity may lead to
public sympathy, and garner funds for the accused's defense). Attorney comment
may also uncover new evidence or encourage witnesses to come forward who were
previously afraid or unaware that they possessed relevant knowledge. Stern, supra
note 48, at 81. Witnesses will not always come forward on their own initiative because "one's perception of her moral duty" depends on whether he or she believes
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While the accused may choose to risk losing jury impartiality in
an attempt to defend himself, the government does not have that
right to risk. 197 Additionally, commentary by the accused or defense counsel rarely biases public opinion against the prosecution.' 98 Even if such a risk exists, our judicial system rests on the
principle that it is better to free a guilty man than to wrongfully
imprison an innocent man.' 99
D.

Lack of Evidence of Impact on Juries

Little substantive evidence demonstrates that publicity unduly prejudices a jury or that attorney comment creates a greater
threat to impartiality than other comment. 20 0 The search for a
completely impartial or "empty minded jury" is fruitless.2 0 ' Innumerable factors influence a juror but it is part of the juror's
that the accused is innocent or guilty. Id. "The popular campaign" may convince
the public that the accused is innocent and therefore generate support. Id.
197 Id. at 98, 101 (the government and the defendant do not share the same rights
and are not equal participants in a trial); Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 66.
198 Stern, supra note 48, at 102.
199 Swift, supra note 38, at 108 (the criminal justice system operates on the premise that society is benefited by the protection of the innocent and that allowing a
guilty individual to go free to ensure protection of the innocent against judicial
abuse "is not too high a price to pay for those protections").
200 Panel Three: The Roles ofJuries and the Press in the ModernJudicialSystem, 40 AM. U.
L. REV. 597, 605 (1991) [hereinafter Panel Three] (emphasizing that the legal system
and its rules make unsupported assumptions about juries). See Edwin Kennebeck,
From the Jury Box, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 235 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975)
(offering a juror's perspective of the problem; Kennebeck served on the jury of a
Black Panther case in the 1970's); Drechsel, supra note 5, at 35 (suggesting that the
issue is "overblown" and that major problems really do not exist); Edith Greene,
Media Effects on Jurors, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1990) (studying general media
effects); Kaplan, supra note 154, at 623 (concluding that news publicity and out-ofcourt statements have "virtually no impact" on jurors); Kobylka & Dehnel, supra
note 12, at 364 (the probability that publicity will aid a defendant's case is greater
than the chance it will prevent an unfair trial); Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial
Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 414 (1990)
(knowledge of the actual effect of publicity on jurors is "fragmentary"); Swift, Model
Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1006 ("no empirical evidence exists" to establish a cause
and effect relationship between attorney generated publicity and jury partiality);
Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 92 (increased publicity and the release or dissemination of prejudicial information do not "inevitably destroy a fair trial" and in fact
such publicity rarely affects trials).
But see Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in CriminalCases with
PreudicialPretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 665, 695 (1991)
(some publicity can threaten an impartial jury if the information concerns a prior
record, incriminating physical evidence or implication in another crime).
201 Royster, supra note 147, at 368-89. A panel of legal professionals suggested
that instead of striving for a "homogenous" jury that knows nothing of the accused,
we should attempt to select "intelligent individuals who can come in and develop
individual stories." Panel Three, supra note 200, at 599-600. "In deliberations when
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sworn duty to disregard prejudicial knowledge before entering
the jury box. 20 2 Although a well-known case engenders excessive
public attention,20 3 rumors and the lay observations of the press
should not be the sole source of information for prospective jurors. 20 4 Knowledgeable, first-hand accounts should also be disseminated. 2 5 The public should weigh all available information
jurors bring those stories and try to reconcile them, hopefully the truth will
emerge." Id.
In cases where the defendant is well known to the public very few prospective
jurors will not have at least minimal knowledge of the defendant's activities and
background and the current allegations. Minow & Cate, supra note 3, at 633. Minow and Cate quoted Mark Twain who described this search as a ridiculous search
for ignorance:
In this age, when a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence,
and probity swears that testimony given under solemn oath will outweigh, with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere
hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own
ignorance and stupidity, and justice would be far safer in his hands
than in theirs. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men
of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?
Id. at 664. (quoting MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 307 (Iowa Center for Textual Studies edition, 1972) (1871). Minow and Cate noted an equally sarcastic criticism of
America's obsession with impartiality in the jury box, in The Daily Telegraph concerningjury selection in Oliver North's trial: "[I]gnorance is the path to enlightenment
.... The slightest taint of interest in the world beyond home and work is enough to
win dismissal." Id. at 634-35. (quoting Brodie, Wanted: 12 Good Men and True, With
Bad Memories, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 8, 1989, at 19). Minow and
Cate argued that given the present abilities of modern communication systems, an
important case would arouse the interest of the public, and "scarcely any of those
best qualified to sit as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to
the merits of the case." Id. at 641 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722
(1961)). Minow and Cate cited several well-publicized cases in the recent past, including the trials of Marion Barry, the Exxon Valdez Tanker Captain Joseph Hazelwood, Leona Helmsley and Manuel Noriega. Id. at 635-36, 636 n. 19.
202 See Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 79-80 (jurors must disregard outside
influences when serving on a jury).
203 See supra note 187 and accompanying text (regarding William Kennedy
Smith). For discussion of highly publicized trials, see Pappas, supra note 36, at
1033 (John DeLorean, Watergate); Graham, supra note 3, at 625 (John DeLorean.
Watergate and John Hinckley); Panel Three, supra note 200, at 602 (Oliver North and
Admiral Poindexter).
204 See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text (examining the value of attorney comment and society's right of access to numerous and varied informational
sources).
205 See Royster, supra note 147, at 370 (responding to the Warren Commission's
apprehension that Lee Harvey Oswald would not have received a fair trial and recommending that the public hear knowledgeable accounts with "at least some
chance of accuracy" rather than gossip).
A panel of legal professionals suggested that when cases receive increased media attention, jurors are often more aware of their responsibility to be impartial.
Panel Three, supra note 200, at 602. "In such cases, jurors feel more responsibility
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prior to determining the propriety of judicial actions.2 6 Jurors,
once selected, can be protected from further exposure to publicity by sequestration.20 7 This solution removes any justification
for depriving the public of information.20 8
Attorney comment rules, with vague unmanageable standards, remove the most knowledgeable sources of information
yet fail to ensure juror impartiality.20 9 Other sources remain to
adulterate potential jurors' minds. 2' 0 Defense statements that
are fraudulent, sensational or unethical rarely bias jurors against
the government. 2t ' Jurors are instructed to evaluate the accused's guilt solely on the evidence presented and are capable of
presuming innocence unless the prosecution proves otherwise.2 12 Disciplinary rules, therefore, needlessly restrain speech
rests on their shoulders to give both the government and, particularly the defendant, a fair shake." Id.
206 Royster, supra note 147, at 370.
207 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (criticizing the trial judge for
failure to sequester jurors, an alternative that the judge should have raised sua
sponte).
208 See Swift, Restraints, supra note 38, at 79-80 (acknowledging that some public
information will be false and emphasizing that a democracy requires informed citizens rather than government censorship of the information flow).
209 See Garry & Riordan, supra note 192, at 578-79 (eliminating press coverage
does not eliminate juror bias). See also supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text
(stating that other sources remain which can prejudice the jury, making the silence
of the most accurate sources valueless).
210 Garry & Riordan, supra note 192, at 578-79 (eliminating press coverage and
attorney comment does not silence rumors and comments by bailiffs and court
personnel).
211 See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of defense
publicity to prejudice jurors against the government). See also Kramer et al., supra
note 200, at 411 (studies indicate that jurors with increased awareness or knowledge of a case are more likely to favor the prosecution than the defense); Kaplan,
supra note 154, at 623 (claiming jurors mistrust reporters and believe that involvement as jurors gives them a better understanding than the press). One legal professional commented that his own personal experience indicated that attempts by
lawyers to sensationalize a case or to act unethically seldom succeed: "Rambo may
succeed in the theater, but he self-destructs in the courtroom." Thomas M.
Reavley, Rambo Litigators:Aggressive Tactics Versus Legal Ethics, TRIAL, May 1991, at 63,
65.
212 Simon, supra note 36, at 520. Simon concluded that juries in the aggregate
are "responsible and rational," even if the individuals comprising the jury are not.
Id. Simon also contended that jurors take their role seriously and recognize that
they must follow the rules and procedures of the court. Id. Criticism of jurors for
capricious and emotional verdicts remains unsubstantiated, according to Simon.
Id. A phone survey which Simon conducted before voir dire of a trial revealed that
jurors were affected by publicity but 59% of those polled claimed they could ignore
the publicity and focus on the evidence presented at court. Id. at 526-27. See HARRY
KALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY 494 (1966) (the jury focuses on the
evidence presented and understands its obligation to render a guilty verdict only
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and ultimately fail to guarantee that pretrial publicity will not influence potential jurors.213
PART III

Several alternatives combat pretrial publicity and preserve
jury impartiality more effectively than disciplinary rules. 14 The
trial judge must exercise judicial power to take reasonable and
specific precautions to ensure jury impartiality.2 15 Although
these precautions may be costly and time consuming, they mitigate the influence of publicity more successfully than disciplinary
rules. 216 Disciplinary rules, which only limit one source of publicity, can also generate costs and delays as courts become mired
in disputes over whether an attorney violated a rule.217
Change of venire and change of venue to a jurisdiction less
when that evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Kramer et al., supra
note 200, at 413 (exposure to publicity does not preclude impartiality); Minow &
Cate, supra note 3, at 656, 659 (jurors, when well-informed, are an essential check
on law enforcement and are not overly influenced by media attention; they are, in
fact, "skeptical about information from the media"); Panel Three, supra note 200, at
602 (jurors are capable of analyzing the evidence and the charges and reaching a
just conclusion).
213 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining the unnecessary harm
caused by disciplinary rules).
214 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (proposing postponement of the trial, change of venue, sequestration, voir dire, judicial instructions to
jurors and narrowly tailored gag orders). See also Isaacson, supra note 180, at 56266 (analyzing success of various methods in alleviating pretrial publicity); Rhode,
supra note 59, at 718 (citing studies indicating that the rules are not strictly enforced-of 30,836 complaints made in 1978, only 626 disciplinary actions (2%) and
124 disbarments (.4%) resulted); Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, 1020 (criticizing Rule 3.6 and its predecessors as "broadly worded regulations," which should
be displaced by more specific alternatives). But see Minow & Cate, supra note 3, at
633 (alternatives may mislead the court into examining media exposure rather than
the existence of prejudice; courts may confuse "unaware" with "impartial").
215 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363 (trial judge has duty to prevent publicity from disturbing the trial process). See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555
(1976) (trial judge bears responsibility for monitoring publicity and ensuring a fair
trial).
216 See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text (criticizing disciplinary rules
because they restrict only source and do not reduce the effect of the information).
See also Isaacson, supra note 180, at 562-67 (for a critique of alternatives to disciplinary rules); Kennebeck, supra note 200, at 240-41 (analysis from a juror's point of
view); Alice M. Padawer-Singer & Allen H. Barton, The Impact of PretrialPublicity on
Jurors' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA, 125, 126 (RitaJ. Simon ed., 1975)
(trial publicity leads to lengthy jury selection, motions, delays, costs, and mistrials,
which burden the judicial system and weaken public respect for the system).
217 Isaacson, supra note 180, at 570 (criticizing rules and noting that in some
cases, the press may have to be subpoenaed and questioned to discover what party
should be disciplined, generating more time-consuming litigation).
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affected by the publicity are two effective remedies that do not
unduly delay the trial process. 2t 8 A continuance may also reduce
the effects of pretrial publicity by allowing public attention to focus elsewhere.2 ' 9 The public's memory of the facts may not entirely fade, but any prejudicial emotions will have subsided.2 2 °
Voir dire, 2 2 ' when aggressively used, effectively eliminates
prejudice from the jury and adequately addresses and determines
the jurors' knowledge of and belief in any publicity. 2 22 No juror
218 Kramer et al., supra note 200, at 435. But see Minow & Cate, supra note 3, at

646-47 (these alternatives may, however, force a defendant to choose between the
Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and a trial in the community in which
the crime was committed).
219 Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033 (1984). The Patton Court found that a
delay "had a profound effect" and although jurors remembered that the crime had
occurred, the "feelings of revulsion" that biased jurors had subsided. Id. at 1035.
See Kramer et al., supra note 200, at 431 (even a twelve day delay eliminated bias
created by factual publicity, allowing jurors to forget); Kerr et al., supra note 200, at
675 (discussing study of simulated jurors finding that continuance eliminated prejudicial effect except for some of the effects of emotional publicity); Minow & Cate,
supra note 3, at 647- 48 (criticizing postponement as ineffective but noting it was the
least studied of judicial remedies).
220 See supra note 219 (analyzing the effectiveness of delaying trials).
221 Defined as "the preliminary examination which the court and attorneys make
of prospective jurors to determine their qualification and suitability to serve as jurors." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).

222 Kerr et al., supra note 200, at 668. Many legal professionals assert that thorough voir dire can be effective in eliminating bias from the jury. Id. at 667. In
highly publicized cases it may be even more effective because courts have something definite to focus on and generally allow more extensive questioning ofjurors.
Id. at 668. With specific publicity to focus questions on, biases are more easily
detected than when questions must search for general biases created by unknown
factors. Id. Voir dire also provides judges and attorneys an opportunity to explain
the law to jurors and for attorneys to develop a rapport with jurors. Id. at 666.
Several studies question the effectiveness of voir dire. Id. at 668-69. These studies,
however, are merely experiments with "mock" juries and trials and neither address
nor study the types of questions asked. Id. at 669-71. Thorough questioning, meticulously crafted, could determine biases that will prevent the juror from focusing
on the evidence. Superficial voir dire, naturally, cannot detect latent bias. More
searching and well-planned voir dire might. Kerr opined that professionals expect
too much from voir dire: "No, it is not disturbing that voir dire accomplishes so
little. What is disturbing is that we expect voir dire to accomplish so much." Id. at
699.
Kerr also cited a study that found that pretrial publicity appeared to have a
stronger effect on juries selected without the benefit of voir dire than on juries
selected with voir dire. Id. at 670. Kerr stated that the study attributed voir dire
with ascertaining biased jurors, persuading jurors to displace preconceived ideas
about the defendant and assisting jurors in understanding the relevant law. Id.
Kerr conducted a separate study with simulated jurors exposed to varying levels of
prejudicial pretrial publicity from different sources and found that pretrial publicity
did not substantially affect individual jurors' pre-deliberation decisions but did affect post-deliberation verdicts. Id. at 672, 675. Kerr also analyzed the effects of
casual and peremptory challenges on jurors and their disposition toward the case.
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can remain completely ignorant of the crime, the subject of the
trial or the accused's identity in a highly publicized case.2 2 3
Thorough questioning, however, can determine whether the juror's outside knowledge may cloud his judgment. 224 This questioning also impresses on jurors the importance of relying solely
on the evidence presented.2 2 5
Once an impartial jury has been selected, sequestration prevents prejudicial publicity from influencing jurors, without unnecessarily infringing the First Amendment rights of any party.2 26
Removing jurors from the media's audience in a highly publicized trial also eliminates reinforcement of any prejudicial information released prior to jury selection.2 2 7
When publicity is not so pervasive to demand sequestration,
a court order may prevent the dissemination of prejudicial infor* 228
mation.
8 Unlike disciplinary rules, a protective order, or "gag
order," is narrowly designed to prohibit the release of specific
information within a particular trial for a definite period of
time.
Such an order may immediately be appealed, unlike disId. at 681-88. For further analysis of the effect of jury challenges see Panel Three,
supra note 200, at 604-07. See also Minow & Cate, supra note 3, at 649-54 (citing
studies that indicate voir dire is ineffective because it fails to elicit honest responses
and may. be affected by social influences); Robert F. Hanley, Voir Dire: The View from
theJury Box, LITIGATION, Summer 1986, at 21 (criticizing attorneys who do not properly manipulate voir dire and ignore its value).
223 See Minow & Cate, supra note 3, at 635-36.
224 See Panel Three, supra note 200, at 602-03 (in high profile cases the judge has a
greater duty to conduct careful voir dire to determine the extent of the jurors'
knowledge and the effect of that knowledge on their judgment); Garry & Riordan,
supra note 192, at 588 (pretrial publicity may enhance the effectiveness of voir dire
by increasing the judges' and attorneys' scrutiny of the jurors which may then uncover latent prejudice). See supra note 222 (examining the usefulness of voir dire).
225 Kerr et al., supra note 200, at 670.
226 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) (sequestering
jurors "enhances the likelihood of dissipating the impact of pretrial publicity and
emphasizes the elements of the jurors' oaths"). But see Isaacson, supra note 180, at
564 (criticizing sequestration as ineffective against pretrial publicity).
227 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966) (insulating jurors protects
them from the press).
228 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361-62 (recommending that trial courts control the
release of information from various sources).
229 Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1051. Gag orders are constitutional if:
a) the publicity to be restrained creates a danger; b) other measures are unlikely to
resolve the publicity problem; and c) the gag order will mitigate the harm. Nebraska PressAss"n, 427 U.S. at 562. See also Pappas, supra note 36, at 1038 (summarizing the standards articulated in Nebraska Press Ass 'n). Id. A gag order is created after
examining the facts involved and the "line between protected and unprotected
speech." Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1051-53. The attorney need not
speculate what speech is forbidden because speech not expressly prohibited in the
order is protected. Id. See also Sallen, supra note 86, at 141 (orders are narrowly
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ciplinary rules which cannot be appealed before speech is either
punished or lost. 2 30 In addition, clear and precise jury instructions remind jurors of their sworn oath to judge solely the evidence presented.2 3 ' Judicial instructions eliminate unconscious
reliance on prejudicial information by distinguishing between judicially approved evidence and extrajudicial comment.2 3 2
Although none of these methods alone remove all the effects of
pretrial publicity, in combination, these alternatives are more
successful and less restrictive than disciplinary rules.
CONCLUSION

Disciplinary rules, such as Model Rule 3.6, cannot resolve
the dilemmas posed by pretrial publicity. 233 Rather, other methods more appropriately and effectively reduce the danger of pretrial publicity without jeopardizing society's interest in free and
open debate. Only disciplinary rules endorsing the clear and
present danger test guarantee that harmful speech is prevented
while harmless speech is not needlessly silenced. 2 3' The clear

and present danger standard upholds traditional protection of
tailored and the presumption that they are unconstitutional assures that they are
only used when absolutely necessary). But see Garry & Riordan, supra note 192, at
577-78 (because gag orders are issued after publicity arises, they may be too late to
prevent prejudice in ajury pool and may be violated by vigilante journalists).
230 Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1053.
231 Padawer-Singer & Barton, supra note 216, at 136. But see Isaacson, supra note
180, at 566 (instructions do not help jurors disregard the prejudicial information);
Kramer et al., supra note 200, at 412 (instructions do not diminish the effect of
publicity but rather strengthen its impact); Minow & Cate, supra note 3, at 648-49
(instructions are merely a "placebo" and require the jurors to perform "mental
gymnastics" to forget information that they have already digested).
232 But see supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text regarding the ineffectiveness of voir dire in determining the juror's unconscious reliance on prejudicial
information.
233 Abel, supra note 58, at 686-87 (the rules cannot resolve the publicity dilemma
because the dilemma is "inherent in the structure of the lawyer's role").
234 See Swartz, supra note 16, at 1436 (clear and present danger analysis is consistent with the strong presumption against prior restraints and the principle that
speech should only be prohibited in extreme circumstances and when no other alternative exists). The only state that has adopted a clear and present danger standard for attorney disciplinary regulations is Virginia. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct.
2720, 2741 (1991). Virginia Disciplinary Rule 7-106 provides:
[A] lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation or the
prosecution or the defense of a criminal matter that may be tried by a
jury shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means
of public communication that he knows, or should know, constitutes a
clear and present danger of interfering with the fairness of the trial by
a jury.
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First Amendment rights and provides explicit guidance in navigating the gray area between unreasonable and unethical commentary and good faith advocacy and criticism of government
functions.235 Some commentators recommend that reasonable
or substantial likelihood tests be applied only in conjunction with
a balancing approach.2 3 6 Such a balancing test would not arbitrarily restrict comment but would instead measure potential
harm against the need for information within each case.2 3 7 Other
commentators recommend a dual standard which acknowledges
that some comment which is prejudicial in one context may be
harmless in another.2 3 8 Both suggestions, however, fail to clearly
define prohibited comment and therefore continue to encourage
self-censorship.
To preserve First Amendment rights, disciplinary rules
should merely prohibit speech that an attorney knows or should
know to be false or made in bad faith.2 3 9 Such a rule would avoid
sanctions against lawyers who are zealously defending their client
in good faith and eliminate interference with an attorney's fiduciary obligations. Allowing attorneys to openly address and attack
misleading or false publicity in court, eliminating unjustifiable reliance on the publicity, would also mitigate the publicity's
impact. 240
More importantly, education and reform within the adversary system should emphasize ethical conduct and condemn the
combative atmosphere which sacrifices justice for legal fees and
R. SuP. CT. pt. 6, § II, DR 7-107.
New Jersey currently applies a substantial likelihood analysis identical to that
proposed by the A.B.A. For text of the New Jersey rule, see supra note 78.
235 See REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 2, at 192, 211 (the clear and
present danger test offers considerable guidance because it requires a fact specific
analysis; any test that does consider the facts of each situation would either provide
too much or too little protection).
236 Rotondo, supra note 84, at 1119-20.
237 Id.
238 Weaver, supra note 84, at 512. Weaver recommended application of the clear
and present danger test when the "possible danger is minimal" and the reasonable
likelihood test when "the danger is great." Id. at 513. Weaver also argued for
different treatment for prosecution and defense counsel, advocating the use of the
clear and present danger protection for defense counsel speech and the less-protective reasonable likelihood standard for the prosecution. Id. at 514.
239 This standard would also punish comment made by an attorney simply for the
sake of winning or to further a personal reputation as a litigator.
240 See Reavley, supra note 211, at 65 (attacking overly aggressive trial tactics of
attorneys, but noting that an attorney has the opportunity to convince the jury that
his adversary is over-zealously advocating without factual support).
VA.
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notoriety. 241 An educational process stressing morality and personal ethics prevents abuse of free speech rights more effectively
than pre-ordained and inflexible standards. When other more
reasonable solutions exist that do not burden free speech, disciplinary rules which place overbroad and indecipherable restrictions on speech cannot be upheld. First Amendment freedoms
are as vital to justice as an unhindered and impartial trial. One
right cannot be arbitrarily extinguished for the sake of another
when suitable alternatives exist which procure a viable compromise.
Kelly Ann Hardy
241 See generally Aronson, supra note 58, at 273 (the teaching of professional responsibility should be re-evaluated); Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 2, at 1054 (the
answer to pretrial publicity is not sanctioning lawyers but revising the educational
process and fostering "an expression of professional disapproval of publicity which
exceeds the attorney's obligations and pushes [First Amendment rights] to the limits); Donald M. Gillmor, 'Trial By Newspaper' and the Social Sciences, 41 N.D. L.REv.
156, 159 (1964) (the adversarial system "gets sidetracked" and becomes concerned
merely with victory); A Time for Restraint, 105 N.J.L.J. 132 (1980) ("[T]he public, the
bar, the media and law enforcement in particular and government in general must
...be responsible in terms of the actions they take and the judgements they make.
Otherwise the landscape will be littered further with the corpses of careers and
reputations."); Reavely, supra note 211, at 63 (the adversary system is a "combat
zone" requiring a redefinition of its operation and goals); Schwab, supra note 3, at
52 (recommending that attorneys, when dealing with press, should convey information but not advocate); Nilsen, supra note 1, at 240 (free speech rights should be
exercised responsibly and for the purpose of furthering freedom); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Schools Must Teach Legal Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 17 (arguing
that law schools fail to adequately foster a respect among students for professional
ethics); Abel, supra note 58, at 681 (a lawyer's many obligations to his client and
society compete with personal interests and threaten the integrity of the adversarial
system); Karl R. Wallace, An Ethical Basis of Communication, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 241, 243 (Thomas L. Tedford et al. eds., 1987) (the process of
educating should emphasize the means of winning, not winning itself).

